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FISSURES, FRACTURES & DOCTRINAL DRIFTS: PAYING THE
PRICE IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR A HALF
DECADE OF AVOIDANCE, MINIMALISM & PARTISANSHIP
Clay Calvert* and Matthew D. Bunker**
ABSTRACT
This Article comprehensively examines how the U.S. Supreme Court’s adher-
ence to principles of constitutional avoidance and judicial minimalism, along with
partisan rifts among the Justices, have detrimentally affected multiple First Amend-
ment doctrines over the past five years. The doctrines analyzed here include true
threats, broadcast indecency, offensive expression, government speech, and strict
scrutiny, as well as the fundamental dichotomy between content-based and content-
neutral regulations.
INTRODUCTION
When the U.S. Supreme Court agreed in June 2014 to hear Elonis v. United
States,1 it directed the parties to address two questions—one constitutional,2 one
statutory.3 The constitutional issue gave the Court an excellent opportunity to clarify
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Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville,
Florida. Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991,
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford
University. Member, State Bar of California. The authors thank students Alexa Jacobson,
Stephanie McNeff and Cristina Rabionet of the University of Florida for their excellent
research and suggestions on several drafts of this Article.
** Reese Phifer Professor of Journalism, College of Communication and Information Sci-
ences, at the University of Alabama. Ph.D., 1993, University of Florida; M.S., 1989, Kansas
State University; J.D., 1985, University of Kansas; B.S., 1979, Kansas State University.
1 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
2 The constitutional question was:
Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person
requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, as re-
quired by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a
“reasonable person” would regard the statement as threatening, as held
by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Elonis, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (No. 13-983).
3 The statutory question was: “Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction
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when speech constitutes an unprotected true threat4 under First Amendment5 juris-
prudence and, in the process, to resolve a lower-court split of authority.6 Furthermore,
the Court had not squarely addressed a true threats case in more than a decade.7
Additionally, it never had heard an Internet-era threats case, such as Elonis, involving
speech posted on a social media platform.8 Indeed, as the Washington Post noted,
“Parties on both sides of the groundbreaking case are asking the court to consider
the unique qualities of social media.”9
But one year later, when the Court issued a less-than-groundbreaking ruling in
Elonis v. United States,10 Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority that it
was “not necessary to consider any First Amendment issues.”11 Why? Roberts reasoned
the jury was incorrectly instructed regarding the mental state necessary to convict
Anthony Elonis under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).12 Resolving the statutory question thus
eliminated the need to address the constitutional one.
of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s
subjective intent to threaten.” Elonis, 134 S. Ct. at 2819.
4 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (identifying “true threats”
as one of the few historical and traditional categories of content not protected by the First
Amendment); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (observing that
“[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech”).
5 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety years
ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties that
apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
6 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit maintains that a subjective intent analysis
“must be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech.” United States v. Bagdasarian,
652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit subscribes to the view “that
a defendant can be constitutionally convicted of making a true threat only if the defendant
intended the recipient of the threat to feel threatened.” United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d
970, 978 (10th Cir. 2014).
In contrast, other federal appellate courts reject requiring subjective intent under the First
Amendment analysis and, instead, hold only that an objective, reasonable-listener standard
is mandated. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 479–81 (6th Cir. 2012); United
States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 523–25 (4th Cir. 2012). Indeed, a majority of federal appellate
courts “employ a purely objective test for determining whether a communication constitutes
a true threat.” White, 670 F.3d at 523.
7 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (providing the Court’s most recent
analysis of the First Amendment true threats doctrine prior to Elonis).
8 See Robert Barnes, A Social Media Test for Justices, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2014, at
A1 (describing Elonis as the Supreme Court’s “first examination of the limits of free speech
on social media”).
9 Id. at A13.
10 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
11 Id. at 2012.
12 Id.
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This is perfectly permissible, of course, under a facet of the doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance.13 As framed by Justice Louis Brandeis eighty years ago, the doctrine
holds that
[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. . . . Thus,
if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving
a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory con-
struction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.14
Justice Felix Frankfurter once described the practice of dodging constitutional
questions “unless such adjudication is unavoidable” as being “more deeply rooted
than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication.”15 Much more recently,
in the student-speech case of Morse v. Frederick,16 Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that
the Court should “adhere to a basic constitutional obligation by avoiding unneces-
sary decision of constitutional questions.”17 Indeed, as First Amendment scholar
Ronald Collins observed in 2012, “There’s a doctrine that this Court loves to preach
called the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance. We don’t reach a Constitutional
question unless we have to.”18
This is not surprising because the Chief Justice endorsed the closely related
doctrine of judicial minimalism19 during his confirmation hearings.20 The nexus be-
tween minimalism and avoidance is snug. As Professor Charles Rhodes asserts, a
“minimalist judge will seek to avoid a constitutional decision if possible, to decide
13 See generally Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding
Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 331 (2015) (providing a timely review of the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance).
14 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
15 Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
16 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
17 Id. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring).
18 Alan B. Morrison et al., Panel Discussion on Recent U.S. Supreme Court Free Speech
Decisions & the Implications of These Cases for American Society, 76 ALB. L. REV. 781, 809
(2012).
19 Minimalism is “a term coined by Cass Sunstein (minimalism’s most prominent advo-
cate).” Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 5 (2009).
20 See Jan Komárek, Reasoning with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Prece-
dent, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 149, 164 (2013) (noting that Roberts “claimed in the nomination
hearings before the Congress Judiciary Committee that he was ‘not sent there to make law’
but to ‘take whatever case comes before [the Court] and just decide the case.’ He thus endorsed
judicial minimalism, with its emphasis on deciding cases ‘narrowly and shallowly’” (altera-
tion in original) (footnote omitted)).
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cases in small, incremental steps, and to respect the holdings (although not necessarily
the dicta) in prior cases.”21
In Elonis, however, adherence to avoidance left some legal observers utterly un-
satisfied.22 For instance, UCLA Professor Eugene Volokh lamented that the Court
ended up deciding only a fairly narrow—and rarely practically
significant—federal statutory question. We still don’t know, fol-
lowing Elonis, whether the “true threats” exception to the First
Amendment (1) covers only statements said with the purpose of
putting someone in fear, (2) applies also to statements said know-
ing that the target will be put in fear, (3) applies also to state-
ments said knowing that there’s a serious risk that the target will
be put in fear, or (4) covers all statements that a reasonable per-
son would view as aimed at putting the target in fear. Indeed, as
best I can tell, the Supreme Court did not resolve the federal cir-
cuit court disagreement on the First Amendment issue that helped
persuade the Court to hear the case.23
Beyond evading the constitutional issue in Elonis, the Court also failed to resolve
the statutory mens rea requirement for 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). This too is troublesome.
As Justice Clarence Thomas fretted in dissent, “Lower courts are thus left to guess
at the appropriate mental state for § 875(c). All they know after today’s decision is that
a requirement of general intent will not do.”24
The same month it decided Elonis, the Court also failed to clarify an even more
chaotic First Amendment doctrine25 in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate
21 Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, What Conservative Constitutional Revolution? Moderat-
ing Five Degrees of Judicial Conservatism After Six Years of the Roberts Court, 64 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1, 6 (2011).
22 See Tony Mauro, Narrow Win for Speech in Online Threats Case, NAT’L L.J. (June 8,
2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202728583213/Narrow-Win-For-Speech-in
-Online-Threats-Case [http://perma.cc/9AUG-ZMQC] (reporting that “the court avoided the
First Amendment altogether in Elonis v. United States, much to the chagrin of speech ad-
vocates who hoped the justices would give wide berth to the range of expression in modern-day
media, social and otherwise”).
23 Eugene Volokh, The Supreme Court Doesn’t Decide When Speech Becomes a Con-
stitutionally Unprotected “True Threat,” WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/01/the-supreme
-court-doesnt-decide-when-speech-becomes-a-constitutionally-unprotected-true-threat/
[http://perma.cc/D2E9-YE3Q].
24 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2018 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25 Professor Mark Strasser contends that the government speech doctrine’s “lack of
definition creates the potential not only for doctrinal confusion, but for use of the doctrine
in alarming ways.” Mark Strasser, Ignore the Man Behind the Curtain: On the Government
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Veterans.26 Specifically, the nascent and problematic government speech doctrine,
which University of Florida Professor Lyrissa Lidsky frankly describes as “lacking
in coherence—to put it mildly,”27 was at the heart of Walker. Although incoherent,
the doctrine is exceedingly important. That is because “when the government is the
speaker, the First Amendment does not apply at all or provide a basis for challeng-
ing the government’s action.”28
Unlike in Elonis, the Court in Walker tackled the constitutional question head on.
The issue was whether Texas’s rejection of a specialty license plate featuring a Confed-
erate battle flag violated the First Amendment rights of the proposed plate’s sponsor,
the Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV).29 Resolving that issue,
in turn, pivoted largely on whether specialty plates in Texas are government speech or
private expression.30 This dichotomy is crucial because, as Justice Samuel Alito wrote
for the Court in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,31 “[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts
government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”32
Thus, if Texas’s specialty plates were deemed government speech, then the Lone
Star State could lawfully discriminate against both the content and the viewpoint of the
SCV’s proposed plate, and the SCV would be powerless to raise a First Amendment
challenge. Conversely, if specialty plates were considered private speech, then the SCV
could mount traditional First Amendment attacks based on both alleged content-based33
Speech Doctrine and What It Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85, 86 (2011) (footnotes
omitted). He argues that
[t]he contours of the doctrine are blurred—there are no clear criteria by
which to determine when the government is speaking or what, if anything,
the government must say to trigger the doctrine’s protections. Not sur-
prisingly, this lack of clarity has caused great confusion in the lower
courts—judges seem not to know how or when to apply the doctrine.
Id. at 85.
26 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
27 Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1976 (2011). The term
“nascent” also seems appropriate here, as the government speech doctrine was recently
described as “newly evolving.” Jeffrey S. Helmreich, Putting Down: Expressive Subordina-
tion and Equal Protection, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 112, 116 (2012). “Problematic”
also seems accurate, with Professor Joseph Blocher observing that the “[g]overnment speech
doctrine is young, and its youthful exuberance and ambition—not to mention its adolescent
awkwardness—has become cause for some parental concern.” Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint
Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 696 (2011).
28 Erwin Chemerinsky, Lecture, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 730
(2011).
29 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2243–44.
30 Id. at 2245–46.
31 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
32 Id. at 467.
33 Content-based speech regulations typically face the strict scrutiny standard of judicial
review. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (observing that “[g]ov-
ernment regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because
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and viewpoint-based discrimination34 by Texas in denying the Confederate battle
flag plate.
In Walker, the Court—with one notable exception—fractured cleanly along per-
ceived partisan lines.35 Only conservative Justice Clarence Thomas, who was nomi-
nated to the Court by Republican President George H.W. Bush,36 crossed over to
join the four liberal-leaning, Democrat-nominated Justices—Stephen Breyer, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor37—to conclude that Texas’s
specialty plates are government speech.38 The other four members of the Court, all
nominated by Republican Presidents—Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Samuel Alito39—dissented and found that specialty
plates are private speech.40
Perhaps inevitably, some speculated that Thomas, the lone African American
Justice, joined the liberals because the Walker specialty plate featured the Confeder-
ate battle flag.41 Adam Liptak wrote for the New York Times that “[t]he liberals, as
of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed,” and noting that content-based
regulations “are subject to strict scrutiny”).
34 Viewpoint-based speech regulations are a subset of content-based regulations. See
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2533 (2014) (labeling viewpoint discrimination “an
‘egregious form of content discrimination’” (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995))); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (asserting that
“[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers
on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant”).
35 See generally Adam Liptak, Right Divided, Disciplined Left Steered Justices, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2015, at A1 (discussing the current partisan and political lines on the Court).
36 See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www
.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [http://perma.cc/PFQ2-3F8U] (last updated Mar. 20,
2016) [hereinafter Biographies] (setting forth the official biographies for the Justices, includ-
ing the names of the Presidents who nominated each); see also Biographies of the Justices,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/educational-resources/biographies-of
-the-justices/ [http://perma.cc/BBS8-LDWR].
37 See Biographies, supra note 36; see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Upholds Texas
Ban of License Plates with Confederate Flag, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2015, at A12 (reporting
that “[t]he court’s other three liberal members joined Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, as
did Justice Clarence Thomas”); Dahlia Lithwick, Editorial, Good Day to Fold Up the
Confederate Flag, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, June 22, 2015, at A7 (noting that “Thomas, the
court’s staunchest conservative,” joined “the court’s left wing without explaining why”).
38 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243 (2015)
(identifying how the Justices voted in Walker).
39 See Biographies, supra note 36.
40 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that Alito was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Kennedy).
41 See Robert Barnes, Texas Free to Say No to Confederate Flag Plates, WASH. POST,
June 19, 2015, at A1, A4 (noting that “Justice Clarence Thomas, the court’s only African
American justice, split with fellow conservatives and joined the court’s liberals in the 5-to-4
decision,” and adding that “[i]t was hard not to speculate that Thomas, who normally sides
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usual, voted as a group—but they were joined by Justice Thomas in a rare alli-
ance.”42 David Savage of the Los Angeles Times noted that Thomas
cast a rare fifth vote on the side of the court’s four liberals to
reject the Confederate license plate. While Thomas regularly sup-
ports 1st Amendment claims, he dissented alone in 2003 when
the justices ruled that members of the Ku Klux Klan had a free-
speech right to burn a cross in a Virginia farm field.43
Regardless of why Thomas joined the liberals in Walker, the other eight Justices
split neatly along partisan lines, leaving the emerging government speech doctrine
more confused than ever.44 Rather than adopt a clear-cut rule for identifying govern-
ment speech, the majority simply applied three key factors that the Court used in its
2009 government speech decision in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.45 Summum
involved a religious group’s efforts to force a Utah municipality “to place a perma-
nent monument in a city park in which other donated monuments were previously
erected.”46 It is thus so factually distinct from Walker’s specialty license-plate sce-
nario that applying factors from Summum to Walker is quite a judicial stretch.
with the conservatives in free speech cases, was swayed by the symbolism of the flag. He did
not write to explain his view of the case” (emphasis added)).
42 Liptak, supra note 37, at A21.
43 David G. Savage, Court Upholds License Plate Limits, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2015, at
A8. The case referenced by Savage is Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). In Black,
Justice Thomas wrote that “[i]n our culture, cross burning has almost invariably meant law-
lessness and understandably instills in its victims well-grounded fear of physical violence.”
Black, 538 U.S. at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He added, in considering whether cross
burning constitutes symbolic speech or merely conduct under the Virginia statute at issue in
the case, that
as one cannot burn down someone’s house to make a political point
and then seek refuge in the First Amendment, those who hate cannot
terrorize and intimidate to make their point. In light of my conclusion
that the statute here addresses only conduct, there is no need to analyze
it under any of our First Amendment tests.
Id. at 394–95.
44 See generally Stephen M. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American Con-
stitutionalism Survive Victory?, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261, 263 (2015) (identifying “[t]he
conservative justices on the Supreme Court” as John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Anthony Kennedy).
45 555 U.S. 460 (2009). In Walker, Justice Breyer identified those factors for the majority
as: (1) “the history of license plates” in terms of whether “they long have communicated mes-
sages from the States”; (2) whether license plates are reasonably identified in observers’ minds
as the speech of the government or a private individual; and (3) whether the government “main-
tains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates.” Walker, 135 S. Ct. at
2248–49 (majority opinion). In brief, then, the factors relate to history, observers, and control.
46 Summum, 555 U.S. at 464.
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Perhaps Justice Breyer, who penned the majority opinion in Walker, did not
fashion a clear, concise rule for determining what constitutes government speech
because, as he wrote in Summum, “the ‘government speech’ doctrine is a rule of thumb,
not a rigid category.”47 In other words, Breyer was reticent to fully flesh out a doc-
trine and, instead, left government speech merely as an inchoate “rule of thumb”—a
phrase he repeated in 2015 in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.48 Justice Alito, who authored
the Court’s opinion in Summum,49 dissented in Walker and asserted that Breyer and
the Walker majority “badly misunderstands Summum.”50 In brief, Walker fails to
advance the government speech doctrine.
With Elonis and Walker serving as timely analytical springboards, this Article
examines how three variables—constitutional avoidance,51 judicial minimalism,52
and partisanship53—have, in several instances since the start of 2011, thwarted the
47 Id. at 484 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
48 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (writing that “the category ‘content
discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather
than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation”
(emphasis added)).
49 Summum, 555 U.S. at 464.
50 Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2258 (Alito, J., dissenting).
51 See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text (addressing the doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance).
52 Judicial minimalism “is the view that courts should resolve cases by issuing narrow
rulings that steer clear of broad principles and wide implications” and that “[w]hatever changes
are effected through judicial rulings should be small and incremental, as judges should resolve
as little as necessary in order to decide the dispute at hand.” Tara Smith, Reckless Caution:
The Perils of Judicial Minimalism, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 347, 352 (2010). As Cass
Sunstein writes, jurists who favor minimalism “decide no more than they have to decide.
They leave things open. They make deliberate decisions about what should be left unsaid.”
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1996).
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT, at ix (1999) (asserting that “[a] minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves
many things undecided,” and adding that such a court “seeks to decide cases on narrow
grounds. It avoids clear rules and final resolutions”); see also John P. Elwood, Jeremy C.
Marwell & Eric A. White, FCC, Fox, and That Other F-Word, 2011–2012 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 281, 305 (2012) (noting the “Roberts Court’s (intermittent) judicial minimalism”); see
generally Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1454 (2000) (providing a review and critique of judicial minimalism).
53 The partisan lines on today’s Supreme Court are clear. Professor Lawrence Baum con-
tends, for example, that
since the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens in 2010, the Supreme
Court for the first time has had ideological blocs that follow party lines
(based on the party of the appointing president) perfectly. To the extent
that partisan divisions reinforce ideological divisions, the Court’s liberal
and conservative Justices are separated from each other to a greater
extent than in the past.
Lawrence Baum, Hiring Supreme Court Law Clerks: Probing the Ideological Linkage
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advancement and coherence of First Amendment doctrine, if not tossed it into greater
confusion.54 In addition to the Court’s 2015 decisions in Elonis and Walker, which,
respectively, failed to clarify the doctrines of true threats and government speech, this
Article analyzes several other cases in the five-year window from January 1, 2011,
through December 31, 2015. These cases all feature either missed opportunities or
doctrinal confusion.55 In short, the outcomes in Elonis and Walker are not outliers.
Other missed opportunities to advance doctrine due to either minimalism or
avoidance include Snyder v. Phelps56 in 2011 and FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc.57 in 2012. To wit, Yale Professor Dan Kahan described Snyder’s outcome as
“anticlimactic”58 and “easy.”59 In turn, University of Virginia Professor A.E. Dick
Howard labeled Fox Television Stations a “case of passing on the chance to fortify
First Amendment values” and perhaps “one of judicial minimalism—passing up a
Between Judges and Justices, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 333, 344 (2014) (footnotes omitted). Baum
and Professor Neal Devins assert that
for the first time in more than a century, the ideological positions of the
justices on today’s Supreme Court can be identified purely by party
affiliation. What that means is that, for the first time in our political
lifetimes, each of the four Democratic appointees has a strong tendency
to favor liberal outcomes, while the five Republicans typically take
conservative positions.
Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Split Definitive, SLATE (Nov. 11, 2011, 5:27 PM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/11/supreme_court_s_partisan
_divide_and_obama_s_health_care_law.html [http://perma.cc/L42G-WD63].
University of Virginia Professor A.E. Dick Howard writes that today’s Court “seems to
be more politically and ideologically driven and divided than ever.” A.E. Dick Howard, The
Changing Face of the Supreme Court, 101 VA. L. REV. 231, 315 (2015).
54 This Article, importantly, does not analyze the general judicial philosophy of Chief Justice
John Roberts. Other scholars have tackled that issue. See, e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez, The
Philosophy and Jurisprudence of Chief Justice Roberts, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 137 (2014).
55 January 1, 2011, was chosen as the starting point for the analysis in this Article be-
cause it corresponds roughly to when the newest member of the Court, Justice Elena Kagan,
took her seat on the bench and, importantly, after her first autumn of hearing oral arguments.
See Biographies, supra note 36 (noting that Kagan “took her seat on August 7, 2010”). In
brief, from January 1, 2011, to December 31, 2015, the composition of the Court remained
the same and heard oral arguments together in all First Amendment cases ruled on during
that time.
56 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
57 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
58 Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Prob-
lems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42 (2011).
59 Id. at 43. See also Clay Calvert, Too Narrow of a Holding? How—and Perhaps Why—
Chief Justice John Roberts Turned Snyder v. Phelps into an Easy Case, 64 OKLA. L. REV.
111, 112 (2012) (asserting that “Chief Justice Roberts avoided multiple interesting and
complex issues in Snyder. The result oversimplified the case, making the outcome, in lay-
person’s terms, a no-brainer”).
952 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:943
more difficult constitutional question in favor of another which, albeit constitutional,
was hardly controversial.”60
In addition to these judicial sidesteps of minimalism and avoidance thwarting
doctrinal growth, other instances of doctrinal confusion are spawned by partisanship.
These include the 2014 ruling in McCullen v. Coakley,61 which detrimentally affects
the fundamental First Amendment dichotomy between content-based and content-
neutral laws.62 Furthermore, the Court’s 2015 decision in Williams-Yulee v. Florida
Bar63 and its 2012 ruling in United States v. Alvarez64 illustrate partisan cleavage in
the meaning and application of the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.65
This is not to suggest, of course, that doctrinal drifts, rifts, and lack of develop-
ment have always been the case since the start of 2011. For instance, in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,66 the Court made it clear for the first time that
“video games qualify for First Amendment protection,”67 and it emphasized that
violent expression is distinct from obscene speech.68 The Court in Brown also ad-
vanced the strict scrutiny standard of review69 not only by succinctly articulating the
test for it,70 but by making it clear that the government must demonstrate “a direct
causal link between”71 the speech and harm to satisfy that test.72 The Court then
reinforced Brown’s causation principle for strict scrutiny one year later in United
States v. Alvarez, where the plurality wrote that “[t]here must be a direct causal link
60 A.E. Dick Howard, Essay, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court at Seven, 98 VA. L. REV.
IN BRIEF 76, 84 (2012).
61 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
62 See infra notes 294–314 and accompanying text (analyzing McCullen).
63 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
64 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
65 Partisanship, of course, also is present in the money-as-speech cases of McCutcheon
v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), and Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). This facet of First Amendment jurisprudence is beyond the scope of
this Article, as the rifts in the money-as-speech niche of cases predate these decisions.
66 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
67 Id. at 2733.
68 See id. at 2735 (writing that “speech about violence is not obscene”).
69 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (asserting that a
content-based speech regulation can only withstand judicial review “if it satisfies strict
scrutiny,” noting that “[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling Government interest,” and adding that “[i]f a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative”).
70 See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (writing that “[b]ecause the Act imposes a restriction on the
content of protected speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict
scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly
drawn to serve that interest”).
71 Id.
72 The Court made it clear that correlation is not the same as causation under this require-
ment. Id. at 2739.
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between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”73 As observed
elsewhere, “the phrase ‘direct causal link’ is brand new within the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence, having only entered the doctrinal lexicon in Brown
and Alvarez.”74
Furthermore, in April 2010—before Justice Elena Kagan joined the Court and,
in turn, before the start of this Article’s analysis—Chief Justice Roberts nimbly nudged
First Amendment doctrine forward across partisan lines in United States v. Stevens.75
Specifically, eight Justices—conservative Samuel Alito was the lone dissenter,76 in
accord with his penchant for not protecting offensive expression77—agreed on a
rather rigid standard for deciding when potentially new categories of expression fall
outside of First Amendment protection.78
Part I of this Article provides an overview of how other scholars perceive the
Court’s First Amendment free speech jurisprudence under the leadership of Chief
Justice Roberts. Part II then examines cases since the start of 2011 in which either
judicial minimalism or constitutional avoidance hampered the progress of First
Amendment doctrine. Next, Part III addresses select cases in which political parti-
sanship among the Justices clouded the articulation and/or application of several
First Amendment doctrines.
Finally, the Article concludes by addressing the collective effects—both pros
and cons—of minimalism, avoidance, and partisanship during the past five years on
the Roberts Court. Importantly, this Part notes that these three variables cannot, stand-
ing alone or considered in the aggregate, completely explain any specific case’s
outcome. Additionally, the conclusion emphasizes that avoidance and minimalism
are not always or necessarily bad things, at least in terms of providing free-speech-
friendly results for the specific litigants involved, as the outcomes in Elonis v. United
States, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. and Snyder v. Phelps reveal. Yet, these
micro-level victories (victories for specific individuals in specific cases) do not
translate to macro-level doctrinal triumphs for future litigants.
73 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012).
74 Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, An “Actual Problem” in First Amendment Juris-
prudence? Examining the Immediate Impact of Brown’s Proof-of-Causation Doctrine on
Free Speech and Its Compatibility with the Marketplace Theory, 35 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 391, 404 (2013).
75 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
76 Id. at 482 (Alito, J., dissenting).
77 See generally Clay Calvert, Justice Samuel A. Alito’s Lonely War Against Abhorrent,
Low-Value Expression: A Malleable First Amendment Philosophy Privileging Subjective
Notions of Morality and Merit, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 121 (2011) (contending that Justice
Alito “embraces a very subjective approach to First Amendment jurisprudence that privileges
what he apparently considers to be decent speech of high value”).
78 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469–72 (rejecting the Government’s proposal that “a claim
of categorical exclusion should be considered under a simple balancing test . . . ‘of the value
of the speech against its societal costs’” (quoting Brief for the United States at 8, Stevens,
559 U.S. 460 (No. 08-769))).
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I. THE ROBERTS COURT & FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: PERSPECTIVES OF
LEADING LEGAL SCHOLARS
This Article concentrates on First Amendment doctrine and, specifically, how
three variables—avoidance, minimalism, and partisanship—have negatively affected
the doctrine since Justice Elena Kagan replaced John Paul Stevens. Other scholars,
however, have examined different facets of the high court’s First Amendment juris-
prudence. Their perspectives are addressed in this Part of the Article.
Perhaps the highest profile analysis to date is Dean Erwin Chemerinsky’s 2011
article, Not a Free Speech Court.79 There, the prolific and renowned constitutional
scholar argued that although “it is tempting to generalize that the Roberts Court is
strongly protective of speech,” the reality is that “the Roberts Court frequently rules
against free speech claims.”80 Chemerinsky explained that
[t]he Roberts Court has consistently ruled against free speech
claims when brought by government employees, by students, by
prisoners, and by those who challenge the government’s national
security and military policies. The pattern is uniform and trou-
bling: when the government is functioning as an authoritarian
institution, freedom of speech always loses.81
Chemerinsky ultimately concluded that, despite some obvious free speech vic-
tories, “a look at the overall pattern of Roberts Court rulings on speech yields a clear
and disturbing conclusion: it is not a free speech Court.”82 In brief, Chemerinsky
debunks what Nadine Strossen, former President of the American Civil Liberties
Union, calls “[t]he conventional wisdom . . . that this Court has been very speech
protective.”83 Similarly, the gist of Chemerinsky’s article was encapsulated by another
scholar as demonstrating that “the Court’s image as an unequivocal defender of
freedom of speech is somewhat inaccurate.”84 Chemerinsky’s article, unlike the one
here, did not focus on the First Amendment doctrinal rifts and drifts caused by avoid-
ance, minimalism, and partisanship.
Professor Lidsky, in a 2012 essay openly modeled on Chemerinsky’s above-
mentioned work, offered a more mixed analysis, focusing not only on the Roberts
79 Chemerinsky, supra note 28.
80 Id. at 724.
81 Id. at 725.
82 Id. at 734.
83 Nadine Strossen, Essay, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
721, 722 (2014).
84 Zvi Triger, Discriminating Speech: The Heterophilia of the Freedom of Speech Doc-
trine, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 349, 355 (2013).
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Court’s free speech jurisprudence, but also its free press decisions.85 She found that
“[t]he media can take heart from the strength of the Roberts Court’s commitment to
protecting unpopular speech,”86 pointing to its 2010 decision in United States v.
Stevens87 and its 2011 opinion in Snyder v. Phelps.88 Yet, when it comes to press
freedom, Lidsky was more critical of the Roberts Court. Citing the Court’s 2010
ruling in the corporate political speech case of Citizens United v. FEC,89 Lidsky
asserted that there are
extensive dicta in Citizens United suggesting that a majority of
the Justices on the Roberts Court are deeply suspicious of the claim
that the media play a special constitutional role in our democ-
racy. This deep suspicion, even hostility, to the media’s role as
the “Fourth Estate” gives cause for concern that future decisions
might erode the few “special rights” the media currently enjoy.90
Professor Lidsky drew support for her thesis from dicta in the majority opinion of
Justice Anthony Kennedy, including his observation that “media corporations accumu-
late wealth with the help of the corporate form, the largest media corporations have
‘immense aggregations of wealth,’ and the views expressed by media corporations
often ‘have little or no correlation to the public’s support’ for those views.”91 Lidsky
thus added skeptically that the majority in Citizens United “appears to view the
‘press’ or ‘media’ as comprised primarily of powerful corporate conglomerates whose
chief mission is seeking profit through manipulation of the political process.”92
Furthermore, she posited that “[i]n the Court’s view, powerful media corporations
have the potential not only to ‘distort’ electoral outcomes but to distort them in ways
that favor their corporate parents.”93
If Professor Lidsky’s interpretation of Citizens United dicta is correct, then the Rob-
erts Court, indeed, may not be a free press court. Ultimately, however, she cautiously
noted “the paucity of press cases before the Court,” and concluded that “any predic-
tions about the Roberts Court’s likely path in ‘press cases’ must be circumspect.”94
85 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819, 1834 (2012)
(writing that her “essay is modeled on Erwin Chemerinsky’s 2011 published lecture entitled
Not a Free Speech Court, in which Professor Chemerinsky attempted to gauge the Roberts
Court’s commitment to free speech protection from its decided cases”).
86 Id. at 1821.
87 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
88 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
89 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
90 Lidsky, supra note 85, at 1831–32.
91 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 351 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
92 Lidsky, supra note 85, at 1833.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1834.
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Echoing this sentiment in 2014 about the dearth of Roberts-era free press cases,
Professor RonNell Andersen Jones of Brigham Young University found that “the
only decisions even possibly characterized as free press cases”95 are two involving the
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) regulation of broadcast indecency.96
Compared to what she considers the halcyon, glory days of press freedom—the 1960s,
1970s, and early 1980s, when “the Court went out of its way to speak of the press and
then offered effusively complimentary depictions of the media in its opinions”97—
today there is a “trend toward less positive characterizations of the press by the
Supreme Court.”98 Jones offered and explored three possible explanations for the mod-
ern Court’s “loss of an inclination to support the newsgathering or public-informing
work of the press.”99 In brief, the conclusions of Professors Lidsky and Jones are very
similar concerning the Roberts Court and press freedom.
When it comes to freedom of speech, however, Professors Toni Massaro and Robin
Stryker of the University of Arizona argue that “the current Court has been quite bullish
on free speech, despite the potentially harmful consequences of the expression.”100 They
tick through a veritable laundry list of cases supporting this conclusion, noting that
[t]he Roberts Court has overturned congressional restrictions on
corporate campaign expenditures and state clean election laws,
upheld the right of religious protesters to picket a serviceman’s
funeral, struck down a congressional measure that restricted
commercial trafficking in images of animal cruelty, and struck
down a state law that sought to restrict minors’ access to violent
video games.101
95 RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It
Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253, 261 (2014).
96 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012); FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
97 Jones, supra note 95, at 256.
98 Id. at 268.
99 Id. at 269. Specifically, she asserts that
there are at least three major categories of explanations that might need
to be explored: the characterizations of the press have changed because
the Court has changed; the characterizations of the press have changed
because the press has changed; and the characterizations of the press
have changed because the public opinion or perception of the press has
changed.
Id. at 262–63.
100 Toni M. Massaro & Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, and
Emerging Evidence on Civility and Effective Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 375,
392 (2012).
101 Id. at 391–92 (footnotes omitted). The cases referred to in this quotation are, in order
of reference from first to last: Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Ariz. Free Enter.
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
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Ultimately, Massaro and Stryker call for civilized discourse in the name of pro-
moting democracy while simultaneously “favor[ing] no new government-imposed
regulations designed to enforce civility norms in any traditional or designated public
forums.”102 They assert that “[t]he call to civil political discourse is not inherently
inconsistent with the First Amendment, with liberal democratic principles, or with
the many ways in which modern culture is hardly civil.”103
In summary, several leading scholars have addressed various aspects of First
Amendment jurisprudence as articulated and as applied by the U.S. Supreme Court
under the leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts. The next two Parts of this Article
take very different tacks. Specifically, they examine how principles of minimalism
and avoidance, along with divisions along lines of political partisanship, have neg-
atively impacted free speech jurisprudence in several of its domains since Justice
Elena Kagan joined the Court.
II. JUDICIAL MINIMALISM & CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE: MISSED
OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE AND CLARIFY DOCTRINES
This Part features four Sections, the first three of which analyze how philoso-
phies of minimalism and avoidance have detrimentally affected First Amendment
doctrines since Justice Kagan joined the Roberts Court. Specifically, Section A
addresses the true threats doctrine in light of Elonis v. United States, and Section B
examines the FCC’s regulation of broadcast indecency and the Court’s contentious
indecency doctrine in its 2012 decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. Sec-
tion C then turns to First Amendment protection of offensive expression in the face
of tort liability in Snyder v. Phelps. Finally, Section D synthesizes and summarizes
these three facets of free speech jurisprudence in which minimalism and avoidance
are evident, if not predominant.
A. True Threats Doctrine
If one First Amendment doctrine screams out the loudest for clarification, it may
well be true threats.104 This relatively new category of unprotected expression is
rooted in the Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Watts v. United States.105 The Court
443 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010); and Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
102 Massaro & Stryker, supra note 100, at 438 (emphasis omitted).
103 Id. at 439.
104 See Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent: How to Understand the
Law Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It Should Be Used Instead of Long-Term Pre-
ventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 825 (2011) (asserting that “the current
doctrine of true threats is incoherent”).
105 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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there made clear that what is an unprotected “threat must be distinguished from what
is constitutionally protected speech.”106 Unfortunately, that was about all the Court
made clear, as it failed to define what constitutes a threat that falls outside the reach
of First Amendment protection.
Instead, the Court concluded that “political hyperbole,”107 like the kind engaged
in by petitioner Robert Watts at a rally near the Washington Monument in August
1966, was not tantamount to an unprotected threat.108 Watts had told the crowd that
“[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B.
J.”109 The Supreme Court, in reversing Watts’s conviction for threatening President
Lyndon B. Johnson, concluded that the “only offense here was ‘a kind of very crude
offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.’”110
Watts is disappointing, Professor Frederick Schauer asserts, because it “provides
virtually no information on just what a threat is other than that what Watts said was
not one.”111 More recently, Brooks Fuller adds that “[d]ue to a perceived dearth of
guidance from the Court in Watts . . . true threats jurisprudence has yet to develop
a clearly articulated test among the circuits.”112 Fuller points out that the “Supreme
Court has offered relatively little guidance . . . regarding the definitions of, and
distinctions between, true threats and political advocacy.”113
The Supreme Court’s 2003 foray into true threats with the cross-burning case
of Virginia v. Black114 only muddled the mess when it comes to whether a defen-
dant’s subjective intent matters in determining when speech constitutes a true threat.
In Black, the Court wrote that true threats include “statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlaw-
ful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”115
But as attorneys Miguel Estrada and Ashley Boizelle observe, the statute in
Black “expressly incorporated an intent-to-intimidate requirement, and thus the Court
was not forced to decide the precise question of whether the First Amendment re-
quires that convictions under such statutes be based on the speaker’s subjective
intent to threaten the recipient of the speech.”116 Put slightly differently, the Court
106 Id. at 707.
107 Id. at 708.
108 Id. at 706.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 708.
111 Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of
Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 211 (2004).
112 P. Brooks Fuller, Evaluating Intent in True Threats Cases: The Importance of Context
in Analyzing Threatening Internet Messages, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37, 52 (2015).
113 Id. at 44.
114 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
115 Id. at 359.
116 Miguel A. Estrada & Ashley S. Boizelle, Looking Ahead: October Term 2014, 2013–
2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 337, 346–47 (2014).
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in Black “did not decide whether a ‘true threat’ required that the speaker subjec-
tively intend to threaten the listener.”117
The result, Professor Clay Calvert writes, “is a circuit split on the question of in-
tent in the aftermath of Virginia v. Black, specifically on the difference between ob-
jective intent and subjective intent.”118 And the bottom line, Professor Mark Strasser
asserts, is that the nation’s high court offers “little guidance with respect to what
constitutes a threat that is outside First Amendment protection. State and lower
federal courts have been trying to make sense of this area of the law, sometimes
seeking to refine what the Court has said and sometimes striking out on their own.”119
And then along came Elonis v. United States.120 It provided the Court with a
prime opportunity to resolve the circuit split on the question of intent, as well as to
address whether (and how) posting messages to online social media platforms, such
as Facebook, affects the true threats analysis.121 Furthermore, Elonis gave the Court
an opening to consider if conveying alleged threats in the form of an artistic, albeit
controversial, mode of expression—in Elonis, the defendant-petitioner contended
his prosecuted messages were merely cathartic, musical raps—makes any difference
in the threats calculus.122
Writing four years before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its 2015 ruling in
Elonis, Professor Charles Rhodes observed that “[t]he Roberts Court typically avoids
constitutional issues by articulating statutory grounds for decisions and assuming the
resolution of issues without actually deciding them.”123 That observation regarding
avoidance proved particularly prescient in Elonis, where the Court addressed only the
federal statutory issue—Anthony Elonis was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)124—
and evaded the constitutional one.125
The majority concluded merely that “negligence is not sufficient to support a
conviction under Section 875(c).”126 Even this statutory conclusion is minimalistic,
117 Peter S. Larson, Is That a Threat?: Elonis v. United States and the Standard of Intent
for True Threat Convictions, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 83, 84 (2015).
118 Clay Calvert, Emma Morehart & Sarah Papadelias, Rap Music and the True Threats
Quagmire: When Does One Man’s Lyric Become Another’s Crime?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
1, 9 (2014).
119 Mark Strasser, Advocacy, True Threats, and the First Amendment, 38 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 339, 368 (2011).
120 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
121 All of the indictments against Anthony Elonis were based on Facebook postings. Id.
at 2005–07.
122 See id. (noting that Anthony “Elonis testified that his posts emulated the rap lyrics
of the well-known performer Eminem, some of which involve fantasies about killing his
ex-wife,” and he explained to one Facebook user, “I’m doing this for me. My writing is
therapeutic”).
123 Rhodes, supra note 21, at 52–53.
124 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
125 See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
126 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013.
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with the majority admitting that it failed to consider “whether recklessness suffices
for liability under Section 875(c).”127 As Professor Suzanna Sherry of Vanderbilt
University Law School put it, Elonis comports with the Roberts Court’s style of
reaching “the narrowest possible rulings. Certainly this is very narrow. Not only did
they not decide any constitutional issue, they didn’t even decide what level of crim-
inal intent is necessary—just that negligence is not enough.”128
This latter omission sparked rebukes from both Justices Clarence Thomas129 and
Samuel Alito, the latter of whom remarked that the majority’s decision
is certain to cause confusion and serious problems. Attorneys and
judges need to know which mental state is required for conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), an important criminal statute. This
case squarely presents that issue, but the Court provides only a
partial answer. The Court holds that the jury instructions in this
case were defective because they required only negligence in
conveying a threat. But the Court refuses to explain what type of
intent was necessary.130
In the process of dodging the constitutional issue, the Court also missed a chance
to address how the online, social-media context of messages affects the true threats
analysis.131 Publishing shortly before the Court decided Elonis, First Amendment
scholar Brooks Fuller argued that the “Court should address in its discussion, if not in
its holding, whether an online communication is itself a contextually relevant factor and
whether usage of social media impacts the intended or objective meaning of a com-
munication.”132 Fuller reasoned that “[b]ecause Internet media provide a unique con-
textual experience, examining how federal courts have analyzed the complexities of
speaker’s intent and audience interpretation of Internet messages is worthwhile to de-
velop a richer sense of the cultural and First Amendment issues raised in Elonis.”133
The Court’s failure in Elonis to clarify the true threats doctrine in the Internet
era is problematic because, as Dean Chemerinsky emphasizes, “Facebook and other
127 Id.
128 See Mauro, supra note 22 (quoting Professor Sherry).
129 Justice Thomas wrote in dissent that “[l]ower courts are thus left to guess at the appro-
priate mental state for § 875(c). All they know after today’s decision is that a requirement
of general intent will not do.” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 2013–14 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131 Erwin Chemerinsky, What the Supreme Court Didn’t Decide This Week, MS. MAG.:
BLOG (June 3, 2015), http://www.msmagazine.com/blog/2015/06/03/what-the-supreme-court
-didnt-decide-this-week/ [http://perma.cc/M5F7-DVL3].
132 Fuller, supra note 112, at 53.
133 Id.
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social media have made it much more common for people to make threatening state-
ments that cause others to fear for their safety and even their lives.”134 Chemerinsky
adds that, regrettably after Elonis, “[t]he issue remains as to what constitutes a true
threat and when may such speech be constitutionally punished. . . . In a world of
Facebook and other social media, it is an issue sure to come back before the court
sometime soon.”135
Other legal experts also were somewhat taken aback by the Court’s failure to
tackle the constitutional issue. Attorney Paul Smith, who argued successfully before
the Supreme Court on behalf of the victors in such high-profile cases as Lawrence
v. Texas136 and Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,137 contends, “The surprise
in Elonis is that the Court did not answer that [First Amendment] question at all.”138
He laments that “[i]t appears that we will have to wait for another day to receive an
answer to the question presented in Elonis.”139
The bottom line is that adherence to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance in
Elonis failed to meaningfully advance the First Amendment true threats doctrine in
the Internet era. What could have been “a ground-breaking case”140 faded and
fizzled. Anthony Elonis certainly scored an individual free speech victory—his con-
viction was tossed out due to the statutory instructional error—but First Amendment
doctrine was left foundering. It thus may be considered a micro-level victory for free
speech at the individual level, but a wash, at best, at the macro level of doctrine.
B. Broadcast Indecency
The Supreme Court’s “decades-old indecency doctrine,”141 which affects ter-
restrial broadcasters’ First Amendment right to air sexual and excretory-related
expression during certain times of the day,142 dates back nearly forty years to FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation.143 There, the Court framed the issue as “whether the First
134 Chemerinsky, supra note 131.
135 Id.
136 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
137 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
138 Paul M. Smith & Jessica Ring Amunson, Some Surprising First Amendment Rulings,
31 COMM. LAW. 14, 14 (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications
/communications_lawyer/summer2015/CL_Sum15_v31n3_Courtside.authcheckdam.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6AFR-6M33].
139 Id. at 15.
140 Larson, supra note 117, at 83.
141 Ilya Shapiro, Introduction, 2011–2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10 (2012).
142 Under the FCC’s current standards, “[i]ndecent programming contains patently of-
fensive sexual or excretory material that does not rise to the level of obscenity.” Obscene,
Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FCC, https://consumercomplaints.fcc.gov/hc/en-us/articles
/202731600-Obscene-Indecent-and-Profane-Broadcasts [http://perma.cc/646N-PJNH].
143 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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Amendment denies government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent
language in any circumstances.”144 A fractured Court held that the First Amendment
does not forbid FCC regulation of broadcast speech that is indecent,145 yet not ob-
scene,146 at least during times of the day when children likely are in the audience.147
Congress earlier had given the FCC statutory authority to regulate obscenity and
indecency, as well as profane language.148
Although Pacifica Foundation narrowly affirmed the FCC’s power to regulate
indecency,149 the FCC “treated fleeting expletives as an aspect of television that was
beyond its reach to punish as indecent” for about a quarter century thereafter.150 But
in 2004, Professor Terri Day wrote, “[T]he FCC completely abandoned its long-
standing policy of not sanctioning fleeting expletives.”151 The FCC announced that
year, in an order centering on the phrase “really fucking brilliant” uttered live by U2
singer Bono during the Golden Globe Awards show,152 that it “could, and would,
sanction broadcasters for airing ‘fleeting and isolated’ expletives.”153
144 Id. at 744.
145 The FCC today defines indecency as “language or material that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory organs or activities.” FED. COMMC’NS
COMM’N, CONSUMER GUIDE: OBSCENE, INDECENT AND PROFANE BROADCASTS 1 (2015),
https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.pdf [http://perma.cc/NA3P-END9]. The
FCC adds that “[i]ndecent programming contains patently offensive sexual or excretory
material that does not rise to the level of obscenity.” Id.
146 Obscene speech is not protected by the First Amendment. See Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press”); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting
forth the current three-part test for determining when speech is obscene).
147 Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748–51.
148 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012) (making it unlawful to convey “any obscene, indecent,
or profane language by means of radio communication”).
149 See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 221, 235–45 (1996) (providing an excellent analysis of the Court’s five-to-four opinion
in Pacifica Found. and noting, among other things, that “[f]or the most part, the five Justices
supporting the Commission were able to unite behind a single majority opinion”).
150 Toby Coleman, Limiting Judges: Placing Limits on Judges’ Power in Hard-look Re-
view, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 883, 884–85 (2011).
151 Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, BLEEEEEP! The Regulation of Indecency, Isolated
Nudity, and Fleeting Expletives in Broadcast Media: An Uncertain Future for Pacifica v.
FCC, 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 469, 484 (2012).
152 See In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4976 n.4 (2004). For other news, videos,
and information about the Golden Globes Awards, see generally GOLDEN GLOBE AWARDS,
http://www.goldenglobes.com.
153 Toby Coleman, Explaining Change and Rethinking Dirty Words: FCC v. Fox Televi-
sion Stations, Inc., 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 71, 72 (2008).
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This policy change154 is important—and dangerous from a free speech perspec-
tive—because, as former ACLU President Nadine Strossen observes, “[A] whole
broadcast can be condemned just because of a single F-word or S-word, and like-
wise for a mere glimpse of a breast for 9/16 of one second, as in the infamous 2004
Super Bowl wardrobe malfunction.”155 It thus is not surprising that the FCC’s policy
shift sparked litigation that eventually reached the nation’s highest court.
Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in June 2011 in FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc.156 (Fox Television Stations II) to consider “[w]hether
the FCC’s current indecency-enforcement regime violates the First or Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.”157 Three instances of alleged indecency pro-
vided the case’s factual underpinnings, with two involving unscripted utterances of
“fuck” or “fucking” by celebrities during the Billboard Music Awards.158
Just two years prior, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.159 (Fox Television
Stations I), the Court passed on a nearly identical constitutional question160 and,
instead, narrowly based its decision then to uphold the FCC’s decision to start tar-
geting the broadcast of fleeting expletives—after years of tolerance161—under the
Administrative Procedure Act.162
154 An in-depth discussion of the reasons for the FCC’s sudden policy change is beyond
the scope of this Article. For background on that topic, see Abner Greene et al., Indecent
Exposure? The FCC’s Recent Enforcement of Obscenity Laws, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1087 (2005).
155 Nadine Strossen, Obscenity & Indecency Law: Why Howl Is Still Silenced, 37 SEATTLE
U. L. REV., at lxi, lxvi (2013).
156 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
157 Id. at 3065–66.
158 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2314 (2012) [hereinafter
Fox Television Stations II]. In accepting an award during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards,
singer and actress Cher proclaimed, “I’ve also had my critics for the last 40 years saying that
I was on my way out every year. Right. So f[uck]’em.” Id. At the same show the following
year, Nicole Richie said, “Have you ever tried to get cow s[hit] out of a Prada purse? It’s not
so f[uck]ing simple.” Id. The third incident involved an episode of the scripted show, NYPD
Blue, which “showed the nude buttocks of an adult female character for approximately seven
seconds and for a moment the side of her breast.” Id.
159 556 U.S. 502 (2009) [hereinafter Fox Television Stations I].
160 See id. at 529 (writing that “[w]e decline to address the constitutional questions at this
time”).
161 William E. Lee, Books, Video Games, and Foul-Mouthed Hollywood Glitteratae: The
Supreme Court and the Technology-Neutral Interpretation of the First Amendment, 14 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 295, 366–67 (2013) (noting that “[f]or nine years after Pacifica, the FCC
emphasized it would only punish repetitive use of the indecent words in Carlin’s monologue
and found no broadcasts deserving sanctions,” and, adding that, “from the late 1980s until
the early 2000s, indecency fines were still rare and generally a small amount”).
162 See Fox Television Stations I, 556 U.S. at 517 (concluding that, under the requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act, the FCC’s “new enforcement policy and its order
finding the broadcasts actionably indecent were neither arbitrary nor capricious”); see also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
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Although Fox Television Stations I was “widely anticipated”163 as the Court’s first
review of its indecency doctrine in the three-plus decades that had passed since Pacifica
Foundation, the result, media defense attorney Robert Corn-Revere writes that the
decision “focused solely on the narrow issue of whether the FCC’s explanation for the
policy change was adequate under the Administrative Procedure Act.”164 Such mini-
malism seemingly peeved Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who wrote in dissent that
“there is no way to hide the long shadow the First Amendment casts over what the
Commission has done. Today’s decision does nothing to diminish that shadow.”165
Fox Television Stations II, however, gave the Court another shot at tackling the
issue in a media landscape radically changed since 1978 when Pacifica Foundation was
decided.166 Crisply encapsulating those changes, attorney Nick Gamse explains that
[a]lthough broadcast television was recognized as a dangerously
pervasive medium in 1978, it is no longer the dominant force that
it once was, with the vast majority of Americans now paying for
subscription television services like cable or satellite. While the
Pacifica Court strove to support parents in their struggle to protect
their children from pervasive inappropriate content by upholding
the Federal Communication Commission’s content regulation,
technological developments like the V-Chip, cable boxes, DVRs,
and satellite boxes have afforded modern parents various self-
help alternatives.167
When the Court issued its June 2012 ruling in Fox Television Stations II,168 how-
ever, it once again skipped the First Amendment issue.169 It resolved the case solely
on Fifth Amendment grounds regarding lack of fair notice to the broadcasters about
the FCC’s policy shift to target fleeting expletives.170 As Justice Anthony Kennedy
wrote for the majority, “the Court rules that Fox and ABC lacked notice at the time
163 Robert Corn-Revere, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.: Awaiting the Next Act,
2008–2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 295, 295 (2009).
164 Id. at 296.
165 Fox Television Stations I, 556 U.S. at 545 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166 See Edward Wyatt, Justices Agree to Consider F.C.C. Rules on Indecency, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2011, at B3 (noting that, in the thirty-three years since Pacifica Found., “the media
landscape has markedly changed, causing several justices to question in recent decisions
whether those standards were still relevant in a world of unfiltered cable television, Internet,
film and radio”).
167 Nick Gamse, The Indecency of Indecency: How Technology Affects the Constitution-
ality of Content-Based Broadcast Regulation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
287, 288 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
168 See 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
169 See id. at 2320.
170 See id.
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of their broadcasts that the material they were broadcasting could be found action-
ably indecent under then-existing policies. Given this disposition, it is unnecessary
for the Court to address the constitutionality of the current indecency policy.”171
In ducking the First Amendment question, Kennedy cited favorably the Court’s
observation more than sixty years ago, in an Equal Protection Clause context, that
“this Court will decide constitutional questions only when necessary to the disposition
of the case at hand, and that such decisions will be drawn as narrowly as possible.”172
Only Justice Ginsburg, in a lone concurrence, suggested how the First Amendment
issues should be resolved.173
The bottom line is that Fox Television Stations II demonstrates judicial mini-
malism, which focuses “on deciding legal questions on as narrow and shallow basis
as possible, and leaving fundamental and difficult constitutional questions open to
democratic deliberation.”174 Attorney John Elwood characterizes the Fox Television
Stations II decision as
narrow not only in the sense of sidestepping the First Amend-
ment claims but also in its application of the due process frame-
work itself. It limited its analysis to just the notice aspects of due
process, as applied to the three broadcasts at issue, avoiding
broader concerns about whether the FCC’s policy was so unclear
it could not be enforced going forward.175
Professor Robert Richards concurs, observing that the Supreme Court in Fox Tele-
vision Stations II “clarified very little with respect to what broadcasters could legally
air on broadcast radio and television.”176 He adds that “more than a decade after Cher
crudely uttered her thoughts about her critics on live television, neither broadcasters nor
the viewing public is any closer to understanding what language today is permissible
in the broadcast media.”177 Similarly, Professor Christopher Fairman writes that
“after two trips to the Supreme Court, we still do not know the answer to one simple
question: Is the live broadcast of a single fleeting expletive indecent?”178
171 Id.
172 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950).
173 Ginsburg wrote that Pacifica Found. “was wrong when it [was] issued,” and that
it now “bears reconsideration.” Fox Television Stations II, 132 S. Ct. at 2321 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
174 Or Bassok, The Court Cannot Hold, 30 J.L. & POL. 1, 19 (2014).
175 Elwood, Marwell & White, supra note 52, at 292.
176 Robert D. Richards & David J. Weinert, Punting in the First Amendment’s Red Zone:
The Supreme Court’s “Indecision” on the FCC’s Indecency Regulations Leaves Broadcasters
Still Searching for Answers, 76 ALB. L. REV. 631, 633 (2012).
177 Id. at 634.
178 Christopher M. Fairman, Institutionalized Word Taboo: The Continuing Saga of FCC
Indecency Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 567, 568–69 (2013) (footnote omitted).
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Why dodge the indecency question? Attorney Barry Chase argues that both Fox
Television Stations I and Fox Television Stations II suggest “a judicial/political effort
to avoid creating a firestorm among certain segments of the public who care deeply
about their children being confronted with ‘Filthy Words.’”179 One such segment
likely is the Parents Television Council, with its mission “[t]o protect children and
families from graphic sex, violence and profanity in the media, because of their
proven long-term harmful effects.”180
But beyond simply failing to address the meaning of indecency and to clarify
the First Amendment implications of that definition, the Court dodged a much larger
question. Professor William Lee asserts that the high court in Fox Television Sta-
tions II
punted and avoided the fundamental question of First Amend-
ment technological neutrality. . . . [T]he Court had been squarely
presented with the opportunity to reconsider the historically dimin-
ished First Amendment status of broadcasting. . . . Whether full
First Amendment protection should be restored to broadcasting,
in light of changing technological and market features, was post-
poned for another day.181
Ultimately, by saving the much larger issues for later, the Court in Fox Televi-
sion Stations II engaged in its “second punt on revisiting Pacifica”182 and, in doing
so, failed to settle an indecency doctrine that, as Professor Faith Sparr writes, is “quite
unwieldy.”183 Subsequent to the Fox Television Stations II decision, the FCC filled
the void left by the Supreme Court by adopting what are, at best, stopgap measures
on indecency. These include the FCC proposing to target only the most “egregious” in-
decency cases and throwing out more than one million aging—if not ossifying—
indecency complaints.184 Such FCC responses, of course, only further drew the wrath
of the Parents Television Council.185 Former FCC Chair Julius Genachowski was
179 Barry Chase, The FCC’s Indecency Jurisdiction: A Stale Blemish on the First Amend-
ment, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 697, 718 (2013).
180 The PTC Mission, PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL, http://w2.parentstv.org/main/About
/mission.aspx [http://perma.cc/8883-AEGR].
181 Lee, supra note 161, at 297–98 (footnotes omitted).
182 Fairman, supra note 178, at 632.
183 Faith Sparr, From Carlin’s Seven Dirty Words to Bono’s One Dirty Word: A Look at the
FCC’s Ever-Expanding Indecency Enforcement Role, 3 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 207, 250 (2005).
184 See Public Notice, FCC Reduces Backlog of Broadcast Indecency Complaints by 70%
(More Than One Million Complaints); Seeks Comment on Adopting Egregious Cases Policy,
28 FCC Rcd. 4082 (Apr. 1, 2013), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-13
-581A1.pdf [http://perma.cc/GN9R-MPDD].
185 See PTC Responds to FCC’s Proposal to Limit Broadcast Decency Enforcement,
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even reduced to tweeting his views about indecency in late April 2013, after baseball
player David Ortiz uttered the word “fucking” during a Boston Red Sox pregame
ceremony that was broadcast live.186
And then, as if waking up from a relatively protracted slumber on the indecency en-
forcement front,187 the FCC in March 2015 issued a notice of apparent liability for for-
feiture for $325,000—the maximum possible amount—against a Roanoke, Virginia
television station that very briefly aired an image of an erect penis in the corner of the
screen during a news story.188 The National Association of Broadcasters, the Radio
Television Digital News Association, and the station now are fighting the proposed
fine.189 This may very well trigger yet another protracted battle that eventually could
get the Supreme Court to resolve the First Amendment issues it ducked in both Fox
Television Stations I and Fox Television Stations II. The bottom line, then, is that
principles of both avoidance and minimalism in Fox Television Stations II have left
the indecency doctrine in shambles.
C. Offensive Expression
In March 2011, the Supreme Court in Snyder v. Phelps190 held that the First
Amendment shielded the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) and its leader, Fred W.
PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL (Apr. 1, 2013), http://w2.parentstv.org/Main/News/Detail
.aspx?docID=2771 [http://perma.cc/FM6X-XEFC].
186 See Arthur Hayes, Opinion, Boston F-Bomb Exemption, USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 2013,
5:32 PM), http://usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/04/24/boston-f-bomb-exemption-column
/21108251.
187 Since the start of 2014, the FCC has taken action in only three broadcast indecency
cases, including the one against the Roanoke, Virginia station described in the text above.
Press Release, FCC Plans Maximum Fine Against WDBJ for Broadcasting Indecent Pro-
gramming Material During Evening Newscast (Mar. 23, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs
_public/attachmatch/DOC-332631A1.pdf. The other two cases involve fines or settlements
of far smaller amounts, with the FCC reporting that,
[i]n April 2014, the Enforcement Bureau settled its investigation into alle-
gations of the broadcast of vulgar language on radio station KRXA(AM),
which resulted in a payment of $15,000. In August 2014, Border Media
Business Trust paid $37,500 in penalties to settle an investigation into
the use of indecent sexual language during a morning show on radio
station KDBR(FM).
Id.
188 See Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In re WDBJ Television, Inc., 30 FCC
Rcd. 3024 (Mar. 23, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-32A.pdf.
189 See Ted Johnson, Broadcasters Protest FCC Indecency Fine to Roanoke TV Station,
VARIETY (July 28, 2015, 2:57 PM), http://www.variety.com/2015/biz/news/fcc-indecency
-roanoke-fine-wdbj-fleeting-expletive-1201550235/ [http://perma.cc/G9NQ-69NH].
190 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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Phelps, from tort liability under the theories of intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED)191 and intrusion into seclusion,192 despite acknowledging the “cer-
tainly hurtful”193 nature of the defendants’ speech.194 Snyder thus is not an example
of constitutional avoidance.195 Indeed, the Court squarely tackled the constitutional
issue and concluded that the First Amendment precluded plaintiff Albert Snyder
from recovering tort damages.196
The case, however, is better viewed as one of judicial minimalism or, perhaps
more charitably put, judicial incrementalism.197 That is because the Court broke little
new ground in its offensive speech jurisprudence in which First Amendment interests
collide with tort law principles.198 Distilling the case down to its key elements, Chief
Justice Roberts concluded for the majority that the WBC was protected largely because
191 Intentional infliction of emotional distress generally involves “four elements: (1) the
defendant’s conduct must be intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous and
intolerable, (3) the defendant’s conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and (4) the
distress must be severe.” Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress as a Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 476 (2000).
192 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (providing that
“[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person”).
193 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460.
194 As described by the Supreme Court, the signs carried by WBC members included the
following messages:
“God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,”
“Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Fag Troops,”
“Semper Fi Fags,” “God Hates Fags,” “Maryland Taliban,” “Fags Doom
Nations,” “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,”
“Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and
“God Hates You.”
Id. at 454.
195 See Jonathan S. Carter, Passive Virtues Versus Aggressive Litigants: The Prudence of
Avoiding a Constitutional Decision in Snyder v. Phelps, 89 N.C. L. REV. 326, 328 (2010)
(cogently arguing that, in Snyder, the “court’s refusal to consider non-constitutional grounds
for disposing of this case was unjustified and constituted an abdication of the court’s self-
imposed jurisprudential obligation to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication,” and
asserting that by not briefing “the non-constitutional issues, the Phelpses were able to force
a ruling on whether their widespread funeral protests and anti-homosexual demonstrations
were protected by the First Amendment”).
196 See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460.
197 See Paul E. Salamanca, Snyder v. Phelps: A Hard Case That Did Not Make Bad Law,
2010–2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 57, 59 (2011) (asserting that the Court in Snyder “took the
incremental tack of reiterating the importance of speech on matters of public concern and
putting the protest in that category” (emphasis added)).
198 See generally David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 755 (2004) (providing an excellent overview of the Supreme Court’s efforts
to apply First Amendment principles to speech-related torts).
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its members “addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful
manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials.”199
Roberts emphasized the minimalness of the decision, pointing out that “[o]ur
holding today is narrow.”200 Furthermore, he added that “our opinion here is limited
by the particular facts before us.”201 He supported this proposition by quoting the
Court’s 1989 ruling in Florida Star v. B.J.F.202 that it should rely “on limited
principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant
case.”203 All of this completely comports with judicial minimalism, which pivots on
“adopting narrow constitutional rulings that decide the case under review rather than
issuing broad directives that affect a large number of other potential conflicts.”204
The “particular facts” to which Roberts referred,205 when combined with “the
Supreme Court’s long-established tradition of favoring speech protection even in cases
involving offensive speech painted a clear picture” of why, as Professor Joseph
Russomanno observed, the WBC had to win.206 A ruling by the Court against the
WBC, Russomanno cogently concluded, “would have established a principle sig-
nificantly at odds with its own cases, its own traditions—especially an unwillingness
to create new categories of unprotected speech—and the First Amendment itself.”207
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a concurring opinion in Snyder that emphasized
the minimal nature of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion by pointing out what it did not
address.208 Breyer emphasized that the Court “does not hold or imply that the State
is always powerless to provide private individuals with necessary protection.”209
199 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
203 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460 (quoting Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 533).
204 Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a
Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 474 (2012).
205 The Roberts majority emphasized the following contextual facts regarding the WBC’s
speech and actions that arguably help to render the outcome anything but earth-shattering:
[T]he picketers complied with police instructions in staging their demon-
stration. The picketing took place within a 10- by 25-foot plot of public
land adjacent to a public street, behind a temporary fence. That plot
was approximately 1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held.
Several buildings separated the picket site from the church. The Westboro
picketers displayed their signs for about 30 minutes before the funeral
began and sang hymns and recited Bible verses. None of the picketers
entered church property or went to the cemetery. They did not yell or
use profanity, and there was no violence associated with the picketing.
Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448–49 (citations omitted).
206 Joseph Russomanno, “Freedom for the Thought That We Hate”: Why Westboro Had to
Win, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 133, 172 (2012) (footnote omitted).
207 Id. at 172–73.
208 See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 461 (Breyer, J., concurring).
209 Id. at 462 (emphasis added).
970 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:943
Indeed, the majority never wrestled with whether the status of the plaintiff as a pri-
vate or public figure should make a difference. Only Justice Samuel Alito, in dissent,
focused on Albert Snyder’s private-figure status.210 Alito’s dissent is not at all shock-
ing; as Ronald Collins writes, Alito is “the Roberts Court’s most consistent critic of
expanding First Amendment free speech rights.”211 The majority, instead, simply
reasoned that “[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for
its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private
concern.”212 In brief, the majority concentrated on the nature of the speech, not the
nature of the plaintiff.
This plaintiff-status omission is peculiar because, in its earlier landmark IIED
decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,213 the Court emphasized that its holding
applied to only “public figures and public officials.”214 As Justice Alito wrote in his
Snyder dissent, the plaintiff in Falwell “was a public figure, and the Court did not
suggest that its holding would also apply in a case involving a private figure.”215
Breyer bridled openly at the Snyder Court’s minimalist approach, writing that
“[w]hile I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the picketing addressed matters of
public concern, I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that
point. A State can sometimes regulate picketing, even picketing on matters of public
concern.”216 In brief, Breyer would have gone further, even in, perhaps, mere dicta.
Were opportunities missed in Snyder to address additional issues? Among other
things, the majority’s opinion in Snyder “seems to intentionally provide no direction
to lower courts,” Professor Strasser writes, on the question of regulating funeral picket-
ing.217 Indeed, the Chief Justice wrote that Maryland’s funeral picketing statute “was
not in effect at the time of the events at issue here, so we have no occasion to consider
how it might apply to facts such as those before us, or whether it or other similar
regulations are constitutional.”218
Professor Strasser argues that Snyder, rather than clarify doctrine, “raises more
questions than it answers.”219 He reasons that
lower courts seeking guidance from the Court cannot help but
feel frustrated. Not only has the Court failed to tell them which
210 See id. at 463 (Alito, J., dissenting).
211 Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First
Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 440 (2012).
212 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451.
213 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
214 Id. at 56.
215 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 474 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
216 Id. at 461 (Breyer, J., concurring).
217 Mark Strasser, Funeral Protests, Privacy, and the Constitution: What is Next After
Phelps?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 279, 321 (2011).
218 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 457.
219 Strasser, supra note 217, at 324.
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factors are important in funeral protest cases in particular, but
the Court has virtually extended an invitation to lower courts to
modify the existing jurisprudence. Consequently, a relatively
clear area of the law is likely to become more, rather than less,
confused. While the result in Phelps may have been correct, the
opinion itself has the potential to be a source of much regret.220
Ultimately, although the victory for offensive expression in Snyder represents
what First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla calls a “robust conception of free
speech,”221 Snyder’s scope was minimal and the decision “left much unaccounted
for.”222 Dean Chemerinsky writes that Snyder simply “reaffirmed one of the most
basic principles of the First Amendment: speech cannot be punished, or speakers held
liable, just because the speech is offensive, even deeply offensive.”223 Indeed, “the
vast majority of legal scholars believe this case was an ‘easy,’ slam dunk decision
for the majority.”224
The bottom line is that the Court’s minimalistic approach in Snyder has both pros
and cons. As encapsulated by Professor Paul Salamanca:
[T]he Court took the modest tack of identifying a category of
protected speech—speech on a matter of public concern—and
refusing to make an exception to that category for Westboro’s
protest. The Court was therefore justified in describing its holding
as “narrow.” This approach has the advantage of being minimalist,
which a court would undoubtedly prefer in a case with strong
cultural implications. On the other hand, this approach perhaps
has the disadvantage of creating false implications about the
scope of unprotected speech.225
Given that the WBC already had prevailed in the Fourth Circuit226 and that eight
Justices affirmed that result, one might reasonably wonder why the Court even took
the case in the first place—unless it hoped to do something more. Granted, Chief
220 Id. at 326.
221 Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doc-
trine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV.
499, 523–24 (2012).
222 Brennan-Marquez, supra note 54, at 151.
223 Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 723–24.
224 Max David Hellman, The Protest Heard Around the World: Why the Supreme Court’s
Decision in Snyder v. Phelps Protects Too Much Speech, Challenges the Court’s Historical
Balance Between Free Speech and State Tort Claims, and Leaves Tort Victims with Little
Remedy, 49 CAL. W. L. REV. 51, 59 (2012).
225 Salamanca, supra note 197, at 78.
226 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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Justice Roberts was able to pen some very expansive and memorable prose about
the power of free expression and why it is important to protect even its most offen-
sive varieties.227 But that big-picture dictum did not advance the doctrine; it just left
a legacy of luxuriant language on to which jurists trying to protect offensive expres-
sion may hitch their legal wagons.228
More than five years have passed since the ruling in Snyder. Lower courts now
are sorting out its scope and contours.229 One legal scholar observed that by 2014,
at least three courts had cited and deployed Snyder in very free-speech-friendly fashion,
yet had simultaneously failed to heed Chief Justice Roberts’s explicit calls for Snyder
to be construed narrowly and confined to its facts.230 How broadly or narrowly other
courts interpret Snyder remains to be seen. And that, ultimately, is in accord with the
view that “[w]hen the Supreme Court issues a minimalist opinion, it transfers de-
cision costs to the lower courts.”231 This means that lower courts must adjudicate
questions, such as whether the status of the plaintiff really matters any more in IIED
speech-based cases, “with little guidance.”232 That is the price paid for minimalism.
D. Synthesis and Summary
Why did the Roberts Court embrace minimalism and avoidance in the areas of
true threats, indecency, and offensiveness described above? One possible answer—
scholars can never truly know why Justices do what they do, so they must deal only
in possibilities—may be that all three cases could have plunged the Court deeply
into the culture wars.
227 The Chief Justice wrote, in the concluding substantive paragraph of the majority opin-
ion, that
[s]peech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of
both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On the
facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker.
As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.
Snyder, 562 U.S. at 460–61. One commentator accurately calls these closing words in Snyder
“a breathtaking piece of rhetoric.” Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Judging Pain, 31 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 233, 245 (2013).
228 See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 408 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting) (citing Chief Justice Roberts’s language quoted in the footnote immediately above
to support the view that a public high school student’s posting of a violent-themed and offensive
-language-laden rap song on the Internet should be protected under the First Amendment).
229 See generally Clay Calvert, Public Concern and Outrageous Speech: Testing the
Inconstant Boundaries of IIED and the First Amendment Three Years After Snyder v. Phelps,
17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 437 (2014) (providing a now slightly dated analysis of how lower
courts are interpreting Snyder in the context of lawsuits for intentional infliction of emotional
distress filed against media defendants).
230 Id. at 473–74.
231 Grove, supra note 19, at 21.
232 Id. at 8.
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Specifically, the unifying variable or component cutting across the realms of
threats, indecency, and offensiveness is civility or, more accurately, the lack thereof.233
Anthony Elonis’s postings were uncivil (to say the least),234 the utterance of variants
of the word “fuck” on broadcast television by celebrities during times of day when
children are in the audience is likely seen by some as uncivil,235 and the WBC’s
expression outside of funerals for U.S. soldiers killed abroad on duty, such as the
one held for Matthew Snyder, is uncivil and insulting on several levels (familial,
military, sexual, and religious, just to start with).236
When it comes to civility, the Court’s admonition in the “Fuck the Draft” case
of Cohen v. California237 still applies: “[I]t is largely because governmental officials
cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters
of taste and style so largely to the individual.”238 In other words, Cohen admonishes
the Court to stay out of the constitutionally thorny thicket of policing civility if at
all possible. As Christopher Wolfe writes, “[T]he modern Court is reluctant to en-
gage in making the distinctions necessary to maintain even a very limited public
orthodoxy.”239 Given this reluctance, it is not surprising that the Court:
233 See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, The Politics of Incivility, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 345
(2012) (providing an excellent discussion of the meaning of civility, especially in the context
of political expression). Professor Bernard Harcourt explains that
[t]he problem in the debate over civil discourse traces back to the slip-
page in the use of the term civility. In its earliest sense, the word civility
was coextensive with the “art of civil government,” with “orderliness
in a state or region,” with the “absence of anarchy and disorder,” with
“citizenship,” and “government”—more simply, it was coextensive
with “politics.” Civility meant the internal ordering of a polis, and in
that sense, civility itself was just as “civil” as politics. In a curious way,
“civil war” marked the outer bounds of civility.
Id. at 349 (footnotes omitted).
234 For example, one of the postings that landed Anthony Elonis in trouble reads as follows:
You know your s[hit]’s ridiculous
when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door
Little Agent lady stood so close
Took all the strength I had not to turn the b[itch] ghost
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat
Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms of her partner.
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2006 (2015).
235 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (setting forth the precise language at issue
in Fox Television Stations II).
236 See supra note 194 and accompanying text (setting forth the messages on the WBC’s
signs).
237 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
238 Id. at 25.
239 Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS.
65, 80 (2000).
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• In Elonis, evaded clarifying the fine line that separates protected offen-
sive and uncivil speech from that which amounts to an unprotected true
threat of violence;
• In Fox Television Stations II, failed to define the line that separates pro-
tected offensive and uncivil speech on the broadcast airwaves from that
which amounts to regulable indecency; and
• In Snyder, failed to address whether the status of the plaintiff as a pri-
vate figure will ever again be relevant for IIED tort liability purposes
when offensive speech is involved and, instead, concentrated on only
the nature of that expression as relating to matters of public concern.
The majority in Snyder, for instance, could have directly written the following:
“The status of plaintiff Albert Snyder as a private figure is irrelevant in determining
whether the First Amendment shields the WBC from IIED liability.” It did not,
however, do that. Instead, it held that “this case turns largely on whether [the] speech
is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.”240
The italicized word “largely” is critical. That is because it necessarily suggests
there is room for other factors—perhaps even the plaintiff’s status as a private
figure—in future IIED speech-based cases to be relevant in determining liability.
Omitting “largely” would have eliminated this possibility.
Furthermore, by not reaching the First Amendment issue and the underlying facts
in Elonis, the Court dodged another facet of the culture wars—the legitimacy of rap as
a form of artistic expression. As noted earlier, Anthony Elonis claimed the prose-
cuted posts were mere raps, mirroring those of popular artists like Eminem.241 Rap,
of course, is “at the center of the concern about the potential harmful effects of violent
or misogynic lyrics on social behavior.”242 Additionally, “[t]here is no denying that
some sects of the adult culture find the language in some rap lyrics offensive.”243
Significantly, it also would have proved difficult for the Justices in Elonis to
wrestle with the ambiguity of meaning in rap music and how that polysemy affects
the true threats analysis. Richard Shusterman asserts that examining rap lyrics “will
reveal in many rap songs not only the cleverly potent vernacular expression of keen
insights but also forms of linguistic subtlety and multiple levels of meaning whose
polysemic complexity, ambiguity, and intertextuality can sometimes rival that of
high art’s so-called ‘open work.’”244 Avoiding these issues in Elonis made sense,
perhaps, because rap is “not an area of expertise for the average judiciary. In spite
240 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011) (emphasis added).
241 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
242 Denise Herd, Changing Images of Violence in Rap Music Lyrics: 1979–1997, 30 J.
PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 395, 395 (2009).
243 Jeanita W. Richardson & Kim A. Scott, Rap Music and Its Violent Progeny: America’s
Culture of Violence in Context, 71 J. NEGRO EDUC. 175, 176 (2002).
244 Richard Shusterman, The Fine Art of Rap, 22 NEW LITERARY HIST. 613, 615 (1991).
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of the fact that hip-hop is now a well-recognized and accepted genus of music, it is
mostly a foreign language to courts, and is treated accordingly.”245
Ultimately, and regardless of why it chose to do so, the Court’s embrace of
minimalism and avoidance in the past five years across the areas of true threats,
broadcast indecency, and offensiveness has failed to advance First Amendment doc-
trine. The Article now examines how partisanship on today’s Court clouds other free
speech doctrines.
III. PARTISANSHIP & RIFTS IN FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES: WHEN
POLITICAL LINES LEAVE DOCTRINES IN DISARRAY
This Part has three Sections, each of which illustrates how political partisanship
among the Justices has hindered First Amendment doctrine since the start of 2011.
Initially, Section A demonstrates how partisanship in 2015 in Walker v. Texas Divi-
sion, Sons of Confederate Veterans246 left the controversial government speech doc-
trine in disarray. Section B then turns to the long-standing First Amendment doctrine
that distinguishes between content-based and content-neutral laws and addresses how
the Court’s 2014 decision in McCullen v. Coakley247 exposed partisan rifts in that
doctrine’s application. Finally, Section C analyzes fractures on the application of the
strict scrutiny along partisan lines in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar248 and, to a much
lesser extent, in United States v. Alvarez.249
A. The Government Speech Doctrine
Government speech, Professor John Inazu observed in 2015, is an “undertheo-
rized realm” of First Amendment jurisprudence.250 Unfortunately, partisanship among
the Justices on the Supreme Court in 2015 in Walker did nothing to either theorize
this doctrine or to clarify it.
As Professor David Anderson explains, four conservative Justices found that
Texas’s specialty license plates constitute private speech, while four liberal Justices
concluded they are government speech.251 Only conservative Justice Clarence Thomas
broke partisan ranks and joined the liberals, giving them the victory.252 Referring to
245 Jason E. Powell, Note, R.A.P.: Rule Against Perps (Who Write Rhymes), 41 RUTGERS
L.J. 479, 480 (2009).
246 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
247 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
248 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
249 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
250 John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159,
1182 (2015).
251 David A. Anderson, Essay, Of Horses, Donkeys, and Mules, 94 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
1, 1–2 (2015).
252 Id. at 2.
976 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:943
the opposite conclusions reached by the Breyer-authored majority opinion and the
Alito-penned dissent described earlier in the Introduction,253 Professor Anderson
surmises that “[t]he principal lesson to be gleaned from these opinions is that the
government-private dichotomy offers no predictable way to decide cases; it only
produces ipse dixit results.”254 That, of course, is no way to leave a doctrine that,
when it does apply, gives the government vast power to suppress expression free
from any and all First Amendment challenges.255
In Walker, Justice Breyer’s liberal-coalition majority relied on and applied the
Court’s 2009 decision in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum256 in holding that Texas’s
license plates are government speech.257 Writing in dissent for a block of four con-
servatives, Justice Alito also applied the same factors from Summum, yet reached the
opposite conclusion.258 As Alito wrote, the characteristics that “rendered public monu-
ments government speech in Summum, are not present in Texas’s specialty plate
program.”259 He added that the Breyer majority “badly misunderstands Summum.”260
In brief, both the Walker majority and the dissent purported to apply the same
Summum criteria, but both reached opposite conclusions in doing so. Government
speech thus is a doctrine in disarray, with partisan cleavage (save for Justice Thomas,
at least in a case involving the Confederate battle flag) driving the wedge.
What is more, as if throwing up his hands in legal disgust, Justice Alito—some-
what snarkily, as if channeling his inner Scalia—proposed another test altogether.261
It focuses simply on what a reasonable observer (positioned near a Texas highway)
would perceive and believe about all 350-plus Texas specialty plates as they passed by:
As you sat there watching these plates speed by, would you
really think that the sentiments reflected in these specialty plates
are the views of the State of Texas and not those of the owners of
the cars? If a car with a plate that says “Rather Be Golfing” passed
by at 8:30 am on a Monday morning, would you think: “This is
the official policy of the State—better to golf than to work?” If
253 See supra notes 35–50 and accompanying text (analyzing the division in Walker).
254 Anderson, supra note 251, at 4.
255 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing the ramifications of the appli-
cation of the government speech doctrine).
256 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
257 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015)
(opining that “[i]n our view, specialty license plates issued pursuant to Texas’s statutory
scheme convey government speech. Our reasoning rests primarily on our analysis in Summum,
a recent case that presented a similar problem”).
258 See id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting) (concluding that “the Texas specialty plate pro-
gram has none of the factors that were critical in Summum”).
259 Id. at 2259.
260 Id. at 2258.
261 Id. at 2255.
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you did your viewing at the start of the college football season
and you saw Texas plates with the names of the University of
Texas’s out-of-state competitors in upcoming games—Notre
Dame, Oklahoma State, the University of Oklahoma, Kansas
State, Iowa State—would you assume that the State of Texas
was officially (and perhaps treasonously) rooting for the Long-
horns’ opponents?262
But the problems seemingly wrought by partisanship run deeper than creating
a reasonable observer test where the result is in the eyes of a mythical beholder.
Professor Anderson contends that the Court in Walker failed to resolve anything re-
garding situations when, as in that case, the speech constitutes a hybrid or combina-
tion of government and private elements.263 Anderson asserts that
[g]ranting certiorari in the Walker case would have made sense
if the Court intended to use the opportunity to grapple with the
phenomenon of hybrid government-private speech, but it did not
even recognize that problem. One wonders why the Court took
a case with so little real-world importance and resolved it in a
way that has little precedential value.264
Beyond the criticisms of Professor Anderson, Dean Chemerinsky argues that the
Walker Court failed to grapple with a perhaps even more troubling aspect of the
government speech doctrine.265 Specifically, he contends that the high Court’s ap-
proach to government speech in Walker
gives the government the ability to avoid free speech challenges by
declaring that something is government speech. Could a city library
choose to have only books by Republican authors by saying that it
is the government speaking? Could a city allow a pro-war demon-
stration in a city park while denying access to an anti-war demon-
stration simply by adopting the former as its government speech?266
The possible answers to these questions are exceedingly problematic, especially in
the public library scenario where the government clearly is the speaker, as it spends
262 Id.
263 Anderson, supra note 251, at 7.
264 Id.
265 Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, Free Speech, Confederate Flags and License Plates,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., http://www.ocregister.com/articles/government-668320-texas-license
.html [http://perma.cc/VQ78-DVGW] (last updated June 25, 2015, 3:57 PM).
266 Id.
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taxpayer dollars to select which books to purchase. As Chemerinsky intimates, the
prospect of viewpoint-based censorship in a public library is not so far fetched unless
the government speech doctrine is soon reined in.267
Writing in another forum, Chemerinsky queries whether, after Walker, “the gov-
ernment [can] issue license plates saying that abortion is murder or endorsing the Re-
publican Party?”268 After all, if expression on a specialty plate is government speech,
then plates bearing such messages are exempt from First Amendment challenges.
Chemerinsky concludes in his other article that the issue in Walker is
sure to recur in many contexts: When is the government the
speaker as opposed to when is the government creating a forum
for private speech? I worry that the court’s approach will make
it too easy for the government to circumvent the First Amend-
ment by claiming that it was the speaker.269
As such, he believes that the conservative Justices got it right in the Walker dissent.270
In brief, the partisanship displayed in Walker did nothing to clear up the govern-
ment speech doctrine. If anything, Walker created more problems, at least if experts
such as Professor Anderson and Dean Chemerinsky are correct.
Ultimately, given the Court’s failure to elucidate anything new about the gov-
ernment speech doctrine (beyond applying factors from the factually distinct Summum
case), one is left sadly, yet quite reasonably, to surmise and speculate—fully embracing
all the worst stereotypes in the process—that the liberal Justices simply objected to
the offensive nature of the Confederate battle flag and thus chose to squelch it. Conser-
vative Justice Clarence Thomas, in turn, joined them only because of his personal
experience with racism as an African American and thus despises the Confederate
battle flag, much as he attacked cross burning as another symbol of Southern bigotry
and worse in 2003.271 Again, these are the worst of stereotypes, but they are what
one is left with to speculate. Indeed, as Chemerinsky writes about Walker:
It is easy to like the result in this case because Confederate
battle flags convey a message of racism that is inherently hurtful
and divisive.
Indeed, it may be for exactly this reason that Justice Clarence
Thomas was the fifth vote in the majority—joining Justices Breyer,
267 Id.
268 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Return of the Jedi: The Progressive October 2014 Term, 18
GREEN BAG 2D 363, 374 (2015).
269 Chemerinsky, supra note 265.
270 Id.
271 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 391 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan—in an alignment that is rare
on the court. In Virginia v. Black (2003), Justice Thomas was the
sole dissenter arguing that the government should be able to ban
cross burning because of its vile history and hateful message.272
The Walker dissent, comprised of a solid block of conservative Justices, com-
ports with the stereotype—at least in some quarters—that some modern conservative
Justices are prone to protect offensive expression.273 As Kathleen Sullivan, former
Dean of Stanford Law School, writes, “It used to be that censorship was associated
with the right and free speech libertarianism with the left. Now we hear new calls
for speech regulation from the left, and increasing endorsement of free speech from
the right.”274 Save for Justice Thomas, Sullivan’s astute analysis fits the partisan-
pattern breakdown in Walker. It also comports with Chemerinsky’s view that the
“justices’ ideology influences the speech they are willing to protect.”275
B. Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations
First Amendment jurisprudence, Professor Randy Kozel writes, embraces a
general “mandate to apply strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions on speech.”276
In contrast, intermediate scrutiny typically applies to content-neutral restrictions.277
Professor Volokh asserts that this “distinction between content-based and content-
neutral rules has become famously critical in recent decades.”278 That is because,
Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat notes, it is traditional “in First Amendment jurispru-
dence that content-based laws are of greater constitutional concern than content-
neutral laws. For restrictions on speech itself, the doctrine imposes strict scrutiny on
272 Chemerinsky, supra note 265.
273 Cf. David L. Hudson, Jr., Chief Justice Roberts and the First Amendment, FIRST AMEND.
CTR. (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/chief-justice-roberts-and-the
-first-amendment [http://perma.cc/XX9Q-2YW2] (writing that “[c]onservatives are often
portrayed as hostile or indifferent to First Amendment freedoms. But in the arena of free
speech Roberts has not been a disaster—far from it”).
274 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
439, 440 (1995); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L.
REV. 971, 973 (1995) (writing that “[i]t used to be that censorship was associated with the
right and free speech libertarianism with the left. But today . . . those political poles have
switched. Now we hear new calls for speech regulation coming from the left and increasing
endorsement of free speech from the right”).
275 See Adam Liptak, For Justices, Free Speech Often Means ‘Speech I Agree With,’ N.Y.
TIMES: SIDEBAR (May 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/us/politics/in-justices
-votes-free-speech-often-means-speech-i-agree-with.html (quoting Chemerinsky).
276 Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1139,
1184 (2015).
277 See Diahann DaSilva, Playing a “Labeling Game”: Classifying Expression as Conduct
as a Means of Circumventing First Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L. REV. 767, 779 (2015).
278 Eugene Volokh, Gruesome Speech, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 908 (2015).
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content-based laws and a relatively deferential form of intermediate scrutiny for
content-neutral laws.”279
Although the dichotomy between content-based and content-neutral regulations
seems tidy in theory, Professor Leslie Kendrick observes that the Court’s application
of it is criticized as “unprincipled, unpredictable and deeply incoherent.”280 That cer-
tainly was the case in the Court’s 2014 decision in McCullen v. Coakley,281 where—but
for Chief Justice Roberts crossing over to join the four liberal-leaning Justices—the
Court split neatly along partisan lines in deciding whether the law at issue was con-
tent based or content neutral. Although all nine Justices agreed with the result in
striking down Massachusetts’s abortion-clinic, buffer-zone law because it was not
narrowly tailored,282 they “were sharply divided on the rationale.”283 The result is a
decision that embodies two of the key variables at the heart of this Article—parti-
sanship and minimalism.
In McCullen, Chief Justice Roberts was joined by liberal Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in finding that the Bay State statute was content
neutral and thus not subject to strict scrutiny.284 Conversely, Justice Scalia, who was
joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas in a concurring opinion, concluded the
statute “should be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny standard applicable to content-
based legislation.”285 Justice Samuel Alito, in turn, penned a separate concurrence
that also rejected the majority’s determination of content neutrality.286 Alito found
279 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1062 (2015)
(footnotes omitted); see also Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination:
Malleable Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 131, 131–32 (2008)
(asserting that the Supreme Court “has devised tests to review content-based and content-
neutral regulations (strict scrutiny for content-based regulations, a more lenient intermediate
scrutiny for those regulations deemed content neutral)”).
280 Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 233 (2012).
281 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
282 The statute provided that
[n]o person shall knowingly enter or remain on a public way or side-
walk adjacent to a reproductive health care facility within a radius of
35 feet of any portion of an entrance, exit or driveway of a reproductive
health care facility or within the area within a rectangle created by
extending the outside boundaries of any entrance, exit or driveway of
a reproductive health care facility in straight lines to the point where
such lines intersect the sideline of the street in front of such entrance,
exit or driveway.
Id. at 2526 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 266, § 120E½(b) (West 2012)).
The measure exempted four classes of individuals from its reach, most notably indi-
viduals entering and leaving such healthcare facilities and the facilities’ own employees, who
were free to talk with patrons entering them. Id.
283 Diane S. Sykes, Minimalism and Its Limits, 2014–2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 17, 24 (2015).
284 See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2534 (concluding “the Act is content neutral”).
285 Id. at 2548 (Scalia, J., concurring).
286 Id. at 2549 (Alito, J., concurring).
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it “clear on the face of the Massachusetts law that it discriminates based on view-
point. Speech in favor of the clinic and its work by employees and agents is permitted;
speech criticizing the clinic and its work is a crime. This is blatant viewpoint discrim-
ination.”287 Professor Catherine Fisk and attorney Jessica Rutter explain that “[b]oth
Justice Scalia and Justice Alito . . . strenuously insisted that the Massachusetts law
was unconstitutional because it discriminated based on the content and viewpoint
of speech: it allowed clinic employees to speak to prospective patients in the buffer
zone but prohibited others from doing so.”288
Why did four conservative Justices deem the law content based, while four
liberal Justices characterized it as content neutral? Professor Kendrick argues the
answer partly rests in the conservative Justices’ willingness to question and discredit
Massachusetts’s asserted interests in adopting the buffer-zone statute and, in turn,
to dig deeper into unspoken motivations: “Judges are likely to have different intui-
tions about what is ‘really going on’ with any number of laws. In McCullen, it is
precisely this point upon which the Justices cannot agree.”289 Kendrick points out
that “Justice Scalia simply rejects that the state’s asserted interests are actually the
interests behind the law.”290 In contrast, she notes that the liberal “majority accepts
the Commonwealth’s assertions that the interests behind the law are in patient safety
and access, as well as preserving unobstructed use of the sidewalks.”291
The macro-level problem, thus, is that, “[i]n the absence of a categorical rule,
judges are left to use their intuitions to ferret out whether a particular law is suspi-
cious.”292 A 2014 Harvard Law Review article avers that, when it comes to distin-
guishing content-based laws from content-neutral ones in cases such as McCullen, the
Court has “struggled to articulate its standards cogently.”293
The political partisanship that divided the Justices in McCullen could be due to the
fact that the statute affected abortion—a topic often separating liberals from conser-
vatives.294 Indeed, as legal affairs reporter David Savage of the Los Angeles Times
287 Id.
288 Catherine Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277, 306 (2015).
289 Leslie Kendrick, Nonsense on Sidewalks: Content Discrimination in McCullen v.
Coakley, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 236 (2014).
290 Id. at 234.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 First Amendment—Freedom of Speech—Content Neutrality—McCullen v. Coakley,
128 HARV. L. REV. 221, 226 (2014).
294 See Clay Calvert, Abortion Buffer-Zone Ruling in McCullen: The Supreme Court’s
Facade of Unity and the Future of Abortion Rights, HUFFPOST POL.: THE BLOG, http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/clay-calvert/abortion-buffer-zone-ruling_b_5534697.html [http://perma
.cc/6M43-HPEH] (last updated Aug. 26, 2014) (asserting that “[t]he bottom line is that
despite agreement among all nine justices on the result in McCullen, abortion drives a deep
wedge into the heart of the Supreme Court, even when the issue is not overruling Roe v.
Wade but a First Amendment controversy”).
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notes, “Abortion is perhaps the most divisive controversy the justices face.”295 This
partisanship now takes on increased urgency, with the Supreme Court in November
2015 agreeing to consider the constitutionality of a Texas statute that severely re-
stricts access to abortion facilities.296
Judge Diane Sykes, on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, argued,
in a lecture at the Cato Institute, that Chief Justice Roberts’s decision in McCullen,
declaring the law content neutral, is substantively minimalistic.297 She asserted that,
by characterizing the statute as content neutral, Roberts
achieved a unanimous judgment, and he did so by writing an
opinion that might be characterized as minimalist in a more sub-
stantive sense. By ruling that the Massachusetts law was content
neutral, the Court signaled that buffer-zone laws are permissible
if properly tailored. That holding leaves room for political decision-
makers to maneuver in this speech-sensitive area. If the decision
on content neutrality had gone the other way, all abortion-clinic
buffer-zone laws would be presumptively unconstitutional, and
the Court’s controversial decision in Hill v. Colorado—which
upheld a buffer-zone law—would have to be overruled or strictly
limited to its facts.298
Delving deeper into comments made by Justice Ginsburg to a National Law Jour-
nal reporter regarding why Ginsburg voted with Roberts in McCullen, Sykes makes
it clear that Roberts “joined with his more liberal colleagues to leave open the possibil-
ity of regulation in this area. The Court’s content-neutrality holding may be debatable,
but there is clear deference to political policymakers here.”299 For Judge Sykes, this
deftly fits within her conception of judicial minimalism as “a theory of deference.”300
Ultimately, whether it was partisanship, minimalism, or some combination thereof,
McCullen causes confusion in distinguishing between content-based and content-
neutral regulations. As Professor Kendrick asserts:
With regard to both content discrimination analysis and content-
neutral scrutiny, the opinions in McCullen show some Justices
ready to jettison rule-like frameworks and rely upon their own
sense of what the Massachusetts legislature did, or what effects
295 David G. Savage, High Court Reenters Abortion Debate, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2015,
at A8.
296 Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, No. 15-274, 2015 WL 5176368 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2015)
(granting petition for writ of certiorari).
297 See Sykes, supra note 283, at 25.
298 Id. (footnote omitted).
299 Id. at 26.
300 Id. at 22.
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it had. In this, the case demonstrates both the need for rules and
their potential futility in highly polarized contexts. In the end,
the Court seems no more able than the litigants to rise above the
level of the sidewalks and their confusing, cacophonous din.301
In 2015, the Court once again addressed the question of whether a statute was con-
tent based or content neutral in the sign-ordinance case of Reed v. Town of Gilbert.302
Reed is mentioned here not because it necessarily involves partisanship—certain opin-
ions in it clearly do, particularly the first and fourth listed below—but because it
does nothing to resolve the partisanship fracture evidenced in McCullen. To wit,
Reed involved a whopping four opinions:
1. The opinion of the Court, authored by conservative Justice Clarence
Thomas and joined by the four other conservatives and a lone liberal,
Justice Sonia Sotomayor;303
2. A concurrence authored by Justice Samuel Alito and joined by Justices
Anthony Kennedy and Sonia Sotomayor;304
3. A lone concurrence in judgment by Justice Stephen Breyer;305 and
4. A concurrence in judgment written by Justice Elena Kagan and joined
by fellow liberal Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer and
no conservatives.306
Kagan’s concurrence, joined by two liberal Justices noted above, expressed ob-
vious fear about the vast sweep of the conservative (save for Justice Sotomayor)
majority’s decision regarding when strict scrutiny applies.307 “I suspect this Court
and others will regret the majority’s insistence today on answering that question
[whether strict scrutiny applies to sign ordinances containing a subject-matter ex-
emption] in the affirmative,” Kagan wrote.308
Although not addressing partisan divides, Professor Volokh points out the crit-
ical discrepancies between Justice Thomas’s majority opinion in Reed and the concur-
ring opinion authored by Justice Alito, in which Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor
joined.309 Examining the list of nine supposedly content-neutral examples of sign
301 Kendrick, supra note 289, at 242 (emphasis added).
302 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
303 See id. at 2223 (Justice Thomas delivering the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Sotomayor).
304 Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
305 Id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring).
306 Id. at 2236 (Kagan, J., concurring).
307 Id. at 2237, 2239.
308 Id. at 2239.
309 Eugene Volokh, Supreme Court Reaffirms Broad Prohibition on Content-Based Speech
Restrictions, in Today’s Reed v. Town of Gilbert Decision, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
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ordinances proffered in Alito’s concurrence, Volokh asserts that two “actually seem
content-based under the majority’s test (which, recall, the three concurring Justices
claim to endorse).”310 Those two examples, according to Volokh, are rules distinguish-
ing between on-premises and off-premises signs and rules imposing time restrictions
on signs advertising a one-time event.311
Reed also illustrates Justice Breyer’s rather squishy balancing notion of the First
Amendment interests that tosses all established First Amendment doctrines—content-
based versus content-neutral regulations included—to the wind.312 Breyer wrote in
Reed, regarding content-based laws, that
[t]he better approach is to generally treat content discrimination
as a strong reason weighing against the constitutionality of a rule
where a traditional public forum, or where viewpoint discrimina-
tion, is threatened, but elsewhere treat it as a rule of thumb, finding
it a helpful, but not determinative legal tool, in an appropriate case,
to determine the strength of a justification. I would use content
discrimination as a supplement to a more basic analysis, which,
tracking most of our First Amendment cases, asks whether the
regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment interests that
is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives.313
(June 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/18
/supreme-court-reaffirms-broad-prohibition-on-content-based-speech-restrictions-in-todays
-reed-v-town-of-gilbert-decision/ [http://perma.cc/HZ2S-GS82].
310 Id.
311 Id. Volokh explains the problems:
Whether a sign advertises a one-time event turns on “the commu-
nicative content of the sign”: To borrow the majority’s John Locke
example, “if a sign informs its reader of the time and place a book club
will discuss John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government” on one occa-
sion, “that sign will be treated differently from a sign expressing the
view that one should vote for one of Locke’s followers in an upcoming
election.” And distinctions between on-premises and off-premises signs
likewise turn on “the communicative content of the sign”—a sign com-
municating something related to what is on the premises (“Home of the
John Locke Society”) would be treated better than a sign communicating
something related to an off-premises activity (“Vote for Joe Schmoe”).
Id.
312 See Linda Greenhouse, The Breyer Project: “Why Couldn’t You Work This Thing Out?,”
4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 37, 39 (2009). As a former New York Times legal correspondent Linda
Greenhouse observes about Breyer’s doctrinal disdain, “even in cases that do not prompt ideolog-
ically polarized responses, the Court approaches many important doctrinal areas through a
priori labels, categories, and tiers of scrutiny—devices that shield the Court from direct encoun-
ters with the facts of many of the cases it decides, to Justice Breyer’s evident frustration.” Id.
313 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2235–36 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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This logic about proportionalism314 and rules of thumb ultimately represents what
Harvard Professor Mark Tushnet aptly calls “Justice Breyer’s partial de-doctrinalization
of the First Amendment.”315 Thus, although Breyer’s concurrence was solo in Reed,
and thus cannot be viewed as creating a partisan divide, it is imperative to note that
he alone causes doctrinal disruption. As Professors Vikram David Amar and Alan
Brownstein note, Breyer tends to engage in a “free-form balancing approach”316 or,
more favorably put by Federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein, a “nuanced view of the need
for flexibility in interpreting the Constitution.”317 This, in the authors’ opinion, is the
antithesis of doctrinal adherence, and it further suggests that Reed, with its four
separate opinions, does little to heal the partisan rifts exposed in McCullen when it
comes to identifying when laws are content based.
C. Strict Scrutiny
As McCullen indicates, sometimes partisanship on the Roberts Court prevents
the Justices from agreeing on when a statute is content based or content neutral. But
as this Section reveals, even when all of the Justices concur that a statute is content
based,318 partisanship nonetheless still affects how they apply and interpret the rele-
vant doctrine—strict scrutiny—for examining such laws. In brief, it is not just a matter
of identifying the correct doctrine but of deciding how it applies.
Strict scrutiny is supposed to be demanding. As Professor Bhagwat explains,
“[M]odern free-speech law is based on the foundational premise that content-based
restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny, and will almost always be inval-
idated.”319 Professor Massaro concurs regarding the theoretical rigorousness of strict
314 See Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content
Neutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1268 (2014) (noting that “in recent years, Justice
Stephen Breyer regularly advocated an incremental and case-specific analysis of First Amend-
ment issues tied to an evaluation of ‘proportionality’ as a way to avoid the ‘straitjacket’ that
accompanies the dichotomies of content neutrality”).
315 Mark Tushnet, Essay, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-Doctrinalization of Free Speech
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 508, 511 (2014) (emphasis added).
316 Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious First Amendment: Alvarez
and Knox in the Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 491, 497 (2013).
317 Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People:
Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 34 (2008).
318 See Todd E. Pettys, Weddings, Whiter Teeth, Judicial-Campaign Speech, and More:
Civil Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2014–2015 Term, 51 CT. REV. 94, 101 (2015) (noting
that in Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, “[e]veryone agreed that Florida was discriminating against
Williams-Yulee’s speech because of its content”).
319 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Signs of (Dis)Content?, 9 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 137, 144 (2015).
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scrutiny, asserting that “[i]n the free speech context, true strict scrutiny has been
construed to set an extremely high bar for the government.”320
But writing just a few years before both Bhagwat and Massaro, Matthew Bunker,
along with Clay Calvert and William Nevin, argued that “First Amendment strict
scrutiny, now more than a half-century old, is arguably a weaker judicial tool today
for measuring the constitutionality of laws targeting speech than it was in the past.”321
Furthermore, Professor Aziz Huq notes that, in its application, “strict scrutiny is
internally variegated.”322 Such skeptical sentiments proved prophetic in April 2015
when the Supreme Court ruled in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar.323
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a five-Justice majority and joined by all four of
the Court’s liberal members (as he was in McCullen), upheld a canon of Florida’s Code
of Judicial Conduct that forbids incumbent judges and candidates for judgeships in the
Sunshine State from personally soliciting campaign funds.324 Significantly, the majority
found that the canon passed muster under the supposedly rigorous strict scrutiny stan-
dard, with the Chief Justice noting that “[a] State may restrict the speech of a judicial
candidate only if the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.”325
Roberts called Williams-Yulee “one of the rare cases in which a speech restric-
tion withstands strict scrutiny.”326 The question now, of course, is whether such
cases will become less “rare” after Williams-Yulee.
That is an important question because, in stark contrast to Roberts’s view—and
demonstrating how partisanship on the Court negatively affects the application of
strict scrutiny—a block of four conservative Justices issued three separate dissenting
opinions.327 All four dissenting conservative Justices agreed with the Roberts-joined,
liberal-coalition majority that strict scrutiny was the proper standard to apply.328 For
example, Justice Scalia wrote in a dissent joined by Justice Thomas that the canon in
question “presumptively violates the First Amendment. We may uphold it only if the
State meets its burden of showing that the Canon survives strict scrutiny—that is to say,
only if it shows that the Canon is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.”329
320 Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 397 (2014).
321 Matthew D. Bunker, Clay Calvert & William C. Nevin, Strict in Theory, but Feeble in
Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y
349, 377 (2011).
322 Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 16, 16 (2012).
323 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
324 Id. at 1662.
325 Id. at 1665.
326 Id. at 1666.
327 See id. at 1675 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Thomas); id. at 1682 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting); id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting).
328 Id. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1685 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 1685
(Alito, J., dissenting).
329 Id. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, none of the conservative Justices quibbled with the majority’s finding
that there was, in fact, a compelling interest at stake.330 Instead, the conservatives
ripped into the majority on the narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny. As Justice
Alito wrote:
Florida has a compelling interest in making sure that its courts
decide cases impartially and in accordance with the law and that
its citizens have no good reason to lack confidence that its courts
are performing their proper role. But the Florida rule is not nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest.
Indeed, this rule is about as narrowly tailored as a burlap
bag.331
The key difference between the majority and dissenting Justices was in how
rigorously, or loosely, they applied the “fit” prong of strict scrutiny. As Justice
Kennedy wrote in dissent, the majority erred “in the application of strict scrutiny.
The Court’s evisceration of that judicial standard now risks long-term harm to what
was once the Court’s own preferred First Amendment test. As Justice Scalia well
explains, the state law at issue fails strict scrutiny for any number of reasons.”332
Specifically, Kennedy found that the majority’s application of the narrow-tailoring
prong was far too lax, asserting that Florida’s judicial canon “comes nowhere close
to being narrowly tailored.”333
As with Justices Alito and Kennedy, Scalia also focused on the narrow-tailoring
prong of strict scrutiny. He opined that the judicial canon
does not narrowly target concerns about impartiality or its ap-
pearance; it applies even when the person asked for a financial
contribution has no chance of ever appearing in the candidate’s
court. And Florida does not invoke concerns about coercion,
presumably because the Canon bans solicitations regardless of
whether their object is a lawyer, litigant, or other person vulnera-
ble to judicial pressure. So Canon 7C(1) fails exacting scrutiny
and infringes the First Amendment.334
330 See id. at 1677 (writing that “I accept for the sake of argument that States have a com-
pelling interest in ensuring that its judges are seen to be impartial,” and also assuming “that
a judicial candidate’s request to a litigant or attorney presents a danger of coercion that a political
candidate’s request to a constituent does not”).
331 Id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting).
332 Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
333 Id.
334 Id. at 1677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The bottom line is that—with the lone exception of Chief Justice Roberts—eight
Justices differed dramatically along partisan lines in interpreting and applying the
narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny. Whether Williams-Yulee signals the start
of a trend, or is an outlier when it comes to applying strict scrutiny in laxer fashion
and along partisan divides, remains to be seen. For now, the dissenting conservatives
in Williams-Yulee applied what some might call “strict scrutiny with teeth,”335 while
the liberals deployed a version of what might be dubbed semi-strict scrutiny.
Finally, it is important to mention here the Court’s 2012 decision in United States
v. Alvarez,336 which evidences fracturing of the strict scrutiny doctrine, albeit only
partially along partisan lines. In Alvarez, a block of three conservative Justices in
dissent artfully dodged the application of strict scrutiny altogether and, in doing so,
issued an opinion that would have upheld the Stolen Valor Act.337 Justice Alito, joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, simply adhered to what he called “a long line of cases
recognizing that the right to free speech does not protect false factual statements that
inflict real harm and serve no legitimate interest.”338 For Alito, “[t]he lies covered
by the Stolen Valor Act have no intrinsic value and thus merit no First Amendment
protection unless their prohibition would chill other expression that falls within the
Amendment’s scope.”339 In brief, partisan ideology can affect the application of
strict scrutiny simply by emboldening some Justices to hold that strict scrutiny is not
even relevant if the entire category of speech ostensibly is not protected.
Although more moderate conservatives Kennedy and Roberts were part of the
Alvarez plurality that applied what Kennedy called “exacting scrutiny”340—he avoided
the phrase strict scrutiny—to strike down the Stolen Valor Act, their conservative
brethren arguably went rogue, as it were, to avoid strict scrutiny in an effort to uphold
the law. Alito “nominally based his reasoning on a categorical rejection of protection
for false speech,” although it can also “be read as an application of definitional balanc-
ing where Justice Alito weighs the broad value of false statements regarding military
honors against the broad harms that could result (or not) from their suppression.”341
Somewhere in between—not surprisingly, given the earlier discussion of his opin-
ion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert 342—the application of strict scrutiny and the categorical
rejection of protection for false speech that causes harm and serves no value was
335 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Establishment Clause During the 2004 Term: Big Cases,
Little Movement, 2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 159, 169 (2005) (using this phrase).
336 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
337 Id. at 2556–57 (Alito, J., dissenting).
338 Id. at 2557.
339 Id. at 2563.
340 Id. at 2548 (plurality opinion).
341 John D. Moore, The Closed and Shrinking Frontier of Unprotected Speech, 36
WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 35 (2014).
342 See supra notes 312–17 and accompanying text (describing Breyer’s concurrence in
Reed and his overall judicial philosophy regarding doctrines).
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Justice Breyer. He applied what he called “intermediate scrutiny”343 to conclude that the
Stolen Valor Act “as presently drafted works disproportionate constitutional harm.
It consequently fails intermediate scrutiny, and so violates the First Amendment.”344
Justice Breyer’s approach in Alvarez has been described as one of “proportion-
ality review.”345 This tack, as Harvard Law School Professor Vicki Jackson writes,
embodies “the idea that larger harms imposed by government should be justified by
more weighty reasons and that more severe transgressions of the law be more harshly
sanctioned than less severe ones.”346 She asserts that in Alvarez, “[a]rguably, both
the plurality opinion and Justice Breyer’s combined the ‘less restrictive means’ test
with a sub silentio evaluation of ‘proportionality as such.’”347
Professor Tushnet argues that “Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the judgment in
United States v. Alvarez provides another example of partial de-doctrinalization.”348
Tushnet points out that Breyer’s analysis of the less restrictive means prong in
Alvarez consists of his “seat-of-the-pants evaluation of alternative means, here not
backed up . . . by empirical studies.”349 A complete discussion of Justice Breyer’s
First Amendment philosophy is beyond the scope of this Article, as others have more
than adequately addressed it.350 Yet, it is important to note that Breyer alone, regard-
less of whether he attracts fellow liberal Justices,351 throws a monkey wrench into the
doctrinal machine. As Kathleen Sullivan notes, Breyer pays attention “to consequences
rather than categories” and “favors flexibility.”352 Indeed, Professor Laura Krugman
Ray wryly writes that Breyer’s “body of opinions . . . has at times defied easy pre-
dictions about Breyer’s jurisprudence.”353
Ultimately, Dean Rodney Smolla argues in an article devoted to Alvarez that
“the Supreme Court has lacked doctrinal discipline in adhering to any consistent and
343 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring).
344 Id. at 2556.
345 Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3097 (2015).
346 Id. at 3098.
347 Id. at 3141.
348 Tushnet, supra note 315, at 511 (footnote omitted).
349 Id. at 514.
350 See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer, 115 YALE L.J. 1675,
1681 (2006) (asserting that “Justice Breyer’s core idea is that the First Amendment’s role is
not simply to protect individuals from direct government restraints on speech,” and adding
that in Breyer’s view, “[t]he First Amendment’s freedom of speech seeks not only to protect
a negative liberty, but also to promote active liberty by encouraging the exchange of ideas,
public participation, and open discussion”).
351 See Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J.
1699, 1699 (2006) (categorizing Breyer as “a liberal (though a moderate one)”).
352 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Essay, Tribute to Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 64 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 25, 27 (2008).
353 Laura Krugman Ray, The Legacy of a Supreme Court Clerkship: Stephen Breyer and
Arthur Goldberg, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 83, 115 (2010).
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clear set of doctrinal principles when analyzing content-based regulation of speech.
This lack of disciplined consistency, highly visible in Alvarez, diminishes stability
and predictability in First Amendment analysis.”354 He points out that Breyer “ap-
peared to invoke no principled methodology at all, other than to announce that inter-
mediate scrutiny was the proper standard,”355 while Kennedy, in writing for the
plurality, “at times seemed grounded entirely in the ‘categorical’ approach, yet at
other times appeared to apply something akin to the analysis commonly associated
with ‘strict scrutiny,’ while borrowing language commonly associated with ‘interme-
diate scrutiny.’”356 Thus, although Alvarez does not involve the clear partisan cleav-
age found in the more recent case of Williams-Yulee when it comes to applying strict
scrutiny, it nonetheless cannot be ignored.
In summary, this Part of the Article illustrated how partisan divisions on the Court
(along with the one-man doctrinal wrecking crew that is Justice Breyer) in the past
five years have negatively affected the government speech doctrine, the choice of
whether to a label a statute content based or content neutral, and the application of
the strict scrutiny doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This Article is not a referendum on the merits and drawbacks of the doctrines
of avoidance and minimalism. Indeed, as one commentator notes, “Many have
praised Chief Justice Roberts and the Roberts Court for its judicial minimalism.”357
Others, in turn, have critiqued—if not eviscerated—minimalism for its flaws.358
This Article, instead, more narrowly examined how avoidance and minimalism,
along with political partisanship, have detrimentally affected multiple First Amend-
ment doctrines during the past five years. Those doctrines stretch from established
ones, such as the long-standing dichotomy between content-based and content-
neutral laws, to nascent ones, such as the government speech doctrine.
A critical caveat here is that avoidance, minimalism, and partisanship—either
individually or collectively—cannot fully explain the outcomes in any of the cases
examined or the long-term impact of those cases on First Amendment doctrines.
Rather, they simply are factors or variables that offer possible explanations for the
problems identified in this Article. Other variables are likely in play, either overtly
or perhaps more subtly as latent forces, pushing the Court to engage in avoidance
and minimalism.
354 Smolla, supra note 221, at 499.
355 Id. at 511.
356 Id.
357 Molly McQuillen, Note, The Role of the Avoidance Canon in the Roberts Court and
the Implications of Its Inconsistent Application in the Court’s Decisions, 62 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 845, 845 (2012).
358 See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism
at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2005).
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For instance, and as suggested earlier,359 the Court’s avoidance in Fox Television
Stations II of the First Amendment question might have been as much driven by the
Justices’ reticence to stride into the cultural quicksand of offensive language as it
was by some deep-seated belief that avoidance, as a constitutional doctrine in and
of itself, is always the wisest path to follow. This possibility, of course, comports with
social theories of the law that, as Professor Lawrence Friedman writes, focus on cul-
ture as a social force influencing the law.360 It also jibes with facets of legal realism
theory, under which law is “embedded in (and the product of) societal realities.”361
Why, in other words, open up another can of legal and cultural worms akin to
Cohen v. California,362 in which the majority wisely counseled “that the Constitution
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.”363 As explained earlier,
the high court in Cohen upheld the right of Paul Robert Cohen to wear a jacket embla-
zoned with the words “Fuck the Draft” in a Los Angeles courthouse corridor in April
1968 “as a means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the
Vietnam War and the draft.”364 Writing for the Cohen majority, Justice John Marshall
Harlan rhetorically asked, “How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive
word?”365 He added that “while the particular four-letter word being litigated here
is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true
that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”366 This aphorism—one man’s vulgarity
is another’s lyric—captures the gist of the Court’s void for vagueness doctrine.367
Similarly, drawing lines today between fleeting expletives uttered on the broad-
cast airwaves—more than forty years post-Cohen and more than three decades after
Pacifica Foundation—is a daunting task. Perhaps it was the cultural and legal dangers
359 See supra notes 233–45 and accompanying text.
360 Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1581
(1989) (noting that social theories “may isolate some particular ‘social force,’ and assign it
the lion’s share of responsibility for law and legal institutions; or they may credit some mix-
ture of factors in the outside world. They may focus on politics, on economic organization,
or on tradition or culture” (emphasis added)).
361 Adam Benforado, The Body of the Mind: Embodied Cognition, Law, and Justice, 54
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1185, 1216 (2010).
362 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
363 Id. at 25.
364 Id. at 16 (quoting California v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)).
365 Id. at 25.
366 Id.
367 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in 2008:
Vagueness doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A conviction fails
to comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained
fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seri-
ously discriminatory enforcement.
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); see also Johnson v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 2551, 2556–61 (2015) (addressing when a law is unconstitutionally vague).
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of running point, as it were, into this linguistic and cultural landmine-laden battlefield
that the Court in Fox Television Stations II did not wish to tread. In other words, the
doctrine of avoidance provided a clean and clear way out of the etymological abyss.
Furthermore, from a pro–First Amendment, free speech perspective, the Court’s
minimalistic decision in Snyder was, of course, an extremely positive thing. The
Court simply reaffirmed—rather than charting a new path forward or, conversely and
more damagingly, reversing direction—the long-standing importance of safeguarding
offensive expression.368 Although the majority avoided wrestling with the private-
figure versus public-figure plaintiff issue in Snyder by instead focusing “largely” on
the nature of the speech,369 some scholars view the case as expanding the First Amend-
ment doctrine from Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell 370—a public-figure plaintiff
IIED case—to now encompass any and all private-figure plaintiff IIED cases.
Professor Lidsky, for instance, predicts that Snyder will “likely . . . be an unmiti-
gated boon to media defendants litigating tort cases in years to come.”371 Professor
Tushnet adds that Snyder can be interpreted as adopting “a rule that a victim cannot
recover for a speaker’s intentional infliction of emotional distress if the vehicle for
inflicting that distress is a comment on a matter of public concern.”372
In addition to the free speech victory for the WBC in Snyder, the constitutional
avoidance demonstrated in Elonis yielded a free speech victory—at least a statutory
one—for Anthony Elonis. After all, the Court reversed the decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which had upheld his conviction.373 And as
George Washington University Professor Jonathan Turley asserts, had the Court
ruled for the government in Elonis, “it would have created a clearly intended ‘chill-
ing effect’ for everyone posting comments that they could be arrested if ‘reasonable
people’ would view their comments as threats.”374
Thus, although avoidance in Elonis certainly left the true threats doctrine in dis-
array, it nonetheless helped to free Anthony Elonis from a forty-four-month federal
prison sentence.375 The micro-level victory, however, may prove short-lived, as
“prosecutors have said they will likely retry him.”376
368 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
369 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
370 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
371 Lidsky, supra note 85, at 1825 (footnote omitted).
372 Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103,
109 (2012).
373 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015).
374 Jonathan Turley, Opinion, Facebook Threats Case Still Menace to Free Speech, USA
TODAY (June 1, 2015, 7:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/06/01/facebook
-rap-supreme-court-speech-elonis-column/28310025 [http://perma.cc/T5QK-55SM].
375 See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007 (noting that “Elonis was sentenced to three years, eight
months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release”).
376 Riley Yates, After SCOTUS Victory, Anthony Elonis Also Acquitted of Domestic
Assault, MORNING CALL (Sept. 29, 2015, 8:19 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc
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In brief, then, the Court—by engaging in minimalism and/or avoidance—was
able to deal free speech victories to, for lack of a better word, scoundrels like Fred
Phelps377 and Anthony Elonis.378 Similarly, by avoiding the First Amendment issue
and, instead, concentrating on the Fifth Amendment question of fair notice,379 the
Court in Fox Television Stations II was able to shield a broadcast network from
liability for airing tawdry statements such as, “Have you ever tried to get cow shit
out of a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking simple.”380 In brief, broadcasters scored a
clean victory for dirty speech and the Court, in turn, escaped the much more knotty
question of whether such speech is indecent and whether the FCC’s policy of tar-
geting fleeting expletives violates the First Amendment.
In summary, Elonis, Snyder, and Fox Television Stations II all produced micro-
level (or individual-level) wins for free expression. Yet, at the larger level of First
Amendment doctrine, that same trio of cases failed to advance the field.
When it comes to partisanship fracturing the Court on the doctrinal issues ad-
dressed above, it is important to note that Chief Justice Roberts crossed lines twice—in
McCullen v. Coakley and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar—to join a block of four
liberal Justices. Similarly, Justice Thomas crossed lines once—in Walker v. Texas
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans—to join the liberal Justices. The reasons
Thomas may have done so were addressed earlier.381
Chief Justice Roberts, of course, has more famously crossed political lines to join
the four liberal Justices on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, angering
conservative Court observers in the process.382 As Adam Liptak wrote for the New
-freemansburg-anthony-elonis-domestic-assault-verdict-20150929-story.html [http://perma
.cc/R3S8-UFNG].
377 Fred Phelps, the lead defendant in Snyder v. Phelps, was aptly described shortly after his
death in 2014 as “the vitriol-spouting leader of Westboro Baptist Church who picketed military
funerals and espoused hatred for gays.” Rick Jervis, Fred Phelps’ Death May Mean End of
Westboro Church, USA TODAY (Mar. 21, 2014, 12:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/nation/2014/03/20/westboro-church-fred-phelps-gay-controversy/6664703/ [http://perma
.cc/23XF-J3CL]. The term “scoundrel” thus seems appropriate for the late Reverend Phelps.
378 The speech in question of Anthony Elonis targeted his estranged wife and was written
“in a prose style reminiscent of the violent, misogynistic lyrics of rap artists he admired.”
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Case Tests the Limits of Free Speech on Facebook and Other
Social Media, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national
/supreme-court-case-tests-the-limits-of-free-speech-on-facebook-and-other-social-media/2014
/11/23/9e54dbd8-6f67-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html [http://perma.cc/MHF7-5SLA].
As Professor Jonathan Turley put it, “[t]here is no question that Elonis has the mentality of
an angry toddler” and that Elonis v. United States “could not have had a less redeeming
character at its core.” Turley, supra note 374. The term “scoundrel” thus seems suitable for
Anthony Elonis.
379 See supra note 171 and accompanying text (addressing how the Court in Fox Tele-
vision Stations II addressed only the Fifth Amendment issue).
380 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
381 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
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York Times in September 2015, Roberts faced a “barrage of criticism” from conser-
vatives after completing his tenth term as Chief Justice.383
So, why did the Chief Justice join the liberals and abandon the conservatives in
Williams-Yulee to uphold a statute limiting the speech of judges in the face of strict
scrutiny review? Brianne J. Gorod, appellate counsel at the Constitutional Account-
ability Center, argues that Roberts has “often said that he wants the justices to be
seen as different than politicians, and whether all of his votes are consistent with that
goal, this one clearly was. As he explained, ‘Judges are not politicians, even when they
come to the bench by way of the ballot.’”384 In brief, Roberts sought in Williams-
Yulee “to make a larger point about the role of the judiciary.”385
If this really is the case, then perhaps Williams-Yulee is a one-off type of case—
confined to speech by members of the judiciary—when it comes to how rigorously
or laxly strict scrutiny is applied. Indeed, Harvard Professor Laurence Tribe writes that
Williams-Yulee “may simply reflect an ad hoc judiciary-only exception to the
Court’s libertarian streak”386 when it comes to political speech and speech-and-
money cases.
In closing, doctrinal disorder in First Amendment jurisprudence is nothing new.
University of Virginia Professor Lillian R. BeVier remarked, in 2005 at a sympo-
sium on free expression, that
[e]very participant at this symposium is familiar with the doc-
trinal disorder that is First Amendment jurisprudence. Each of us
has struggled to make sense of the myriad views about the Amend-
ment’s objectives and the ultimate ends that it serves or ought to
serve. Each of us has tried to understand the doctrines and to
make them cohere, even as we have watched them proliferate.387
This Article ultimately illustrated how avoidance, minimalism, and partisan-
ship contributed to this doctrinal predicament over the past five years on the Roberts
Court. It now will be interesting to see whether and how, particularly in light of
Justice Scalia’s death in February 2016, this trio of variables affects First Amend-
ment jurisprudence in the coming years.
USA TODAY (June 25, 2015, 1:26 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015
/06/25/supreme-court-obamacare-first-take/29267581/ [http://perma.cc/ND26-9HJ5].
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